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Article

Of Mice and Men: On the Seclusion of
Immigration Detainees and Hospital
Patients
†

Stacey A. Tovino

INTRODUCTION
On April 28, 2013, twenty-four-year-old Elsa GuadalupeGonzales hanged herself while in United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody at the Eloy Detention
1
Center in Eloy, Arizona. Two days later, forty-year-old Jorge
Garcia-Mejia committed suicide at the same detention facility,
2
also by hanging. Guadalupe-Gonzalez and Garcia-Mejia are 2
of 153 detainees who died in ICE custody between October 2003
3
and October 2015.
Immigration detainees who hang themselves usually do so
while in seclusion; that is, while confined to a cell that is
isolated from the general detention center population for

† Lehman Professor of Law and Director, Health Law Program, William
S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I thank Daniel
Hamilton, Dean, William S. Boyd School of Law, for his generous financial
support of this research project. I also thank the attendees of the Sixteenth
Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities for
their comments on earlier drafts and presentations of this Article. I further
thank Jeanne Price (Director, Wiener–Rogers Law Library), Chad Schatzle
(Student Services Librarian, Wiener–Rogers Law Library), and Andrew
Martineau (Research Librarian, Wiener–Rogers Law Library) for their
outstanding assistance in locating many of the sources referenced in this
Article. Copyright © 2016 by Stacey A. Tovino.
1. Press Release, Immigration & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t Homeland
Sec., ICE Detainee Passes Away at Eloy Detention Center (Apr. 30, 2013)
[hereinafter First Eloy Detainee].
2. Press Release, Immigration & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t Homeland
Sec., ICE Detainee Under Criminal Investigation Passes Away at Eloy
Detention Center (May 2, 2013) [hereinafter Second Eloy Detainee].
3. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., LIST OF
DEATHS IN ICE CUSTODY, OCTOBER 2003–OCTOBER 26, 2015 (2015)
[hereinafter ICE DEATHS].
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purported administrative, disciplinary, or protective reasons.
Forty-four-year-old Ana Romero Rivera hanged herself while in
seclusion at Franklin County Regional Jail in Frankfort,
5
Kentucky, on August 21, 2008. Romero Rivera, who was
waiting to be deported to El Salvador, was secluded simply
6
because she refused to eat. Approximately 300 detainees are
secluded every day in the fifty largest detention centers in the
United States, and nearly half of these detainees are secluded
7
for fifteen days or more at a time.
In addition to suicide during seclusion, other detainees
have been injured or have died while in restraints; that is,
while they have a reduced or complete inability to move their
arms, legs, head, or body freely due to the application of any
manual, mechanical, or physical method, device, material, or
8
piece of equipment. In early 2007, guards at the Elizabeth
Detention Center in Elizabeth, New Jersey, shackled and
pinned to the floor Boubacar Bah, a fifty-two-year-old tailor

4. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(1)(ii) (2014) (defining seclusion in the context
of federal hospital law in a similar manner); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122-1401(C)(59) (2016) (defining seclusion in the context of Ohio psychiatric hospital
law in a similar manner); Humphry Osmond, The Seclusion Room––Cell or
Sanctuary?, 9 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 18, 18–19 (1958) (providing background
information regarding the use of seclusion in the health care context). This
Article uses the term seclusion to encompass a variety of practices and places
referred to in the context of immigration detention as administrative
segregation, disciplinary segregation, separation, confinement, solitary
confinement, isolation, the hole, the secure housing unit, and the special
management unit. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., INVISIBLE IN
ISOLATION: THE USE OF SEGREGATION AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 3 (2012) [hereinafter NIJC] (defining and
distinguishing some of these terms and explaining that “[t]he vocabulary
surrounding segregation and solitary con[fi]nement often can be misleading or
confusing”); infra text accompanying notes 111–15 (discussing this Article’s
choice of language).
5. See Steve Lannen & Valarie Honeycutt Spears, Questions Remain in
Immigrant’s Jail Death, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Nov. 20, 2008), http://
www.kentucky.com/latest-news/article43983495.html.
6. See id. (“Romero’s brother-in-law, Mario Aguilar, says Romero was
placed in isolation because she refused to eat.”).
7. See Editorial, Immigrants in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/opinion/immigrants-in-solitary.html
[hereinafter Immigrants in Solitary] (providing data regarding detainee
seclusion).
8. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(1)(i)(A), (B) (defining restraint for
purposes of the federal Medicare Conditions of Participation for Hospitals).
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from Guinea who had overstayed a tourist visa. Shortly after,
Bah was transported to a nearby hospital in Newark, New
Jersey, where he remained in a coma after emergency
department personnel diagnosed him with a skull fracture and
10
multiple brain hemorrhages. Bah died four months later, on
11
May 30, 2007, without ever regaining consciousness. Three
weeks later, twenty-three-year-old detainee Victoria Arrelano
12
died while shackled to her bed in San Pedro, California. Even
though she had AIDS and frequently vomited blood, staff
members at the San Pedro Service Processing Center refused to
remove Arrelano’s restraints, rendering her helpless to move
13
away from her own excrement.
Seclusion- and restraint-related injuries and deaths used
to be common in other contexts, including in the health care
14
context. Between 1988 and 1998, 142 patients died during or
shortly after episodes of seclusion or restraint in hospitals and
15
other health care facilities located across the United States.
9. See Nina Bernstein, Few Details on Immigrants Who Died in Custody,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/05/nyregion/
05detain.html.
10. See id.
11. See id.; see also ICE DEATHS, supra note 3, at no.78.
12. See ICE DEATHS, supra note 3, at no.77.
13. See Greg Krikorian, Family To Sue over Detainee’s Death, L.A. TIMES
(Aug.
11,
2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2007/aug/11/local/me
-custody11. In theory, detention staff restrain detainees only to minimize
injuries to detainees, to prevent escape or serious damage to detention center
property, or to maintain the security and orderly operation of the detention
center. See IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,
PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS pt. 2.15(I), at 208
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 PBNDS]. Unfortunately, many detainees are
restrained for other purposes, including coercion, discipline, convenience, or
retaliation. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Volunteers Report on Treatment of
Immigrant Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/29/nyregion/29visitors.html (explaining that detention centers,
including local jails, restrain detainees in violation of ICE standards because
it’s “convenient and cheap”).
14. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Psychiatric Restraint and Seclusion:
Resisting Legislative Solution, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 511, 518–53 (2007)
[hereinafter Tovino, Psychiatric Restraint] (historicizing restraint and
seclusion use in the health care setting in the United States, providing data
regarding the deaths associated with these interventions, and reviewing the
development of federal and state laws governing the use of these
interventions).
15. Eric M. Weiss et al., Hundreds of the Nation’s Most Vulnerable Have
Been Killed by the System Intended To Care for Them, HARTFORD COURANT,
Oct. 11, 1998, at A1, ProQuest Newsstand, Doc. No. 256283163.
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Of these 142 deaths, 23 patients died after being restrained by
staff in face-down floor holds, 20 patients died after they were
restrained using leather wrist and ankle cuffs or vests, and
33% percent of the patients died of asphyxia, including
16
17
asphyxia caused by hanging and other means.
Following the investigation and publication of these
deaths, patient safety advocates, journalists, and other
stakeholders urged lawmakers to reform federal and state laws
governing the use of seclusion and restraint in the health care
18
setting. Health law reform quickly followed, including new
federal and state patients’ rights standards that included more
stringent regulation of the use of seclusion and restraint in
hospital and other health care settings, mandatory staff
training regarding safe seclusion and restraint practices, and
mandatory reporting of seclusion- and restraint-related
19
deaths. Post-law reform studies reported associations between
the reduction in seclusion and restraint use and lower numbers
of patient injuries and deaths, shorter hospital lengths of stay,
decreased rates of re-hospitalization, lower rates of medication
usage, lower costs, higher levels of patient functioning at the
20
time of discharge, and increased patient satisfaction.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Scott H. Nelson et al., An Unusual Death of a Patient in
Seclusion, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 259, 259 (1983) (reporting a
case in which a secluded patient asphyxiated himself with his mattress cover).
18. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MENTAL HEALTH: IMPROPER
RESTRAINT OR SECLUSION USE PLACES PEOPLE AT RISK 1 (1999) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT] (noting that concern over restraint- and seclusion-related
injuries and deaths led to proposed legislation); Dave Altimari & Eric M.
Weiss, Reform Urged in Use of Restraints: U.S. Lawmakers Respond to Report
on Deaths, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 17, 1998, at A1, ProQuest Newsstand,
Doc. No. 256071724 (referencing the call of Senator Christopher J. Dodd (DConn.) for more stringent standards governing the use of restraint and
seclusion in psychiatric hospitals).
19. See, e.g., Hospital Conditions of Participation: Patients’ Rights,
Interim Final Rule with Comment, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,070, 36,070 (July 2, 1999)
(creating interim final rule that would establish new rights of patients in
Medicare-participating hospitals, including the right to be free from restraints
used in the provision of acute medical and surgical care unless clinically
necessary and the right to be free from seclusion and restraints used in
behavior management unless clinically necessary); Medicare and Medicaid
Programs; Hospital Conditions of Participation: Patients’ Rights, 71 Fed. Reg.
71,378, 71,378 (Dec. 8, 2006) (promulgating final rule revising standards
governing the use of restraint and seclusion in Medicare-participating
hospitals); Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Hospital and Critical
Access Hospital Conditions of Participation, 77 Fed. Reg. 29,034, 29,034 (May
16, 2012) (revising certain restraint- and seclusion-related standards).
20. See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S.
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With a special focus on federal provisions strictly
regulating Medicare-participating hospitals’ use of seclusion,
this Article uses developments in health law as a lens through
which the uses and abuses of seclusion in immigration
detention centers might be assessed and through which the
standards governing detention centers might be improved. In
particular, this Article argues that the unenforceable standards
governing seclusion in immigration detention, including the
most recent version of ICE’s Performance-Based National
21
Detention Standards, were incorrectly modeled on correctional
standards developed for use in jails and prisons with respect to
22
convicted criminals. This Article asserts that correctional
standards are inappropriate guidelines for use in the
immigration detention context for several reasons. First,
immigration detention is supposed to be a form of civil, not
23
criminal, detention, and most detainees have no criminal
record or have committed only minor crimes such as traffic
24
violations. Second, many detainees are extremely physically
and emotionally vulnerable due to their history of torture and
25
trauma. Third, many immigrants have lacked access to health

DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE BUSINESS CASE FOR PREVENTING AND
REDUCING RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION USE 4 (2011) [hereinafter SAMHSA,
BUSINESS CASE] (citing dozens of studies reporting cost savings and other
patient benefits associated with restraint- and seclusion-use reductions;
concluding that “[s]ubstantial savings can result from effectively changing the
organizational culture to reduce and prevent the use of restraint and
seclusion”).
21. See 2011 PBNDS, supra note 13.
22. See, e.g., NIJC, supra note 4, at 11–12 (“[T]he 2011 PBNDS are still
based on American Correctional Association (ACA) pre–trial detention
standards for jails and prisons . . . .”).
23. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (“We have long
recognized that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty,’ but it is not, in a
strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in
nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process.”
(citations omitted)); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952)
(“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently
classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”).
24. See, e.g., NIJC, supra note 4, at 8 (“The majority of immigration
detainees have no criminal record, or have committed only minor crimes or
traffic violations, often years before being detained by ICE.” (internal
references and citations omitted)).
25. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN, SUICIDE AND SELF-HARM IN
THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION NETWORK 45–46 (2013) (stating that a history
of torture and trauma are among the factors contributing to self-harm in
immigration detention in Australia, as “[s]tudies have indicated that people
who have fled violence and disruption in their countries of origin, and who
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insurance and health care since they entered the United States,
and they continue to lack access to adequate mental health care
26
following their detention.
Borrowing the philosophy behind legally enforceable
federal patients’ rights laws that govern the use of seclusion in
hospitals, this Article proposes to reform the unenforceable
standards governing the use of seclusion in immigration
detention centers. Under the federal Medicare Conditions of
27
all hospital
Participation (Conditions of Participation),
patients have a legally enforceable right to be free from mental
28
and physical abuse. Patients have the specific right to be free
from seclusion imposed as a means of coercion, discipline,
29
convenience, or retaliation by hospital staff. Seclusion may be
ordered for only one reason; that is, to manage violent or selfdestructive behavior that jeopardizes the immediate physical
30
safety of the patient herself, a staff member, or other person.
In the hospital context, only a physician or other licensed
31
independent health care practitioner may order seclusion, and
each order for seclusion may last no longer than four hours for
32
an adult patient. Regardless of the length of time specified in
may have been subject to torture and trauma, often exhibit preexisting mental
health conditions or are vulnerable to developing a post traumatic condition”).
26. See, e.g., Fatma Marouf, Creating a Subclass of Immigrants with
Deferred Action Status: Denial of Health Care as an Enduring Disability,
HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (Dec. 1, 2014), http://hamilton-griffin.com/
guest-blog-fatma-marouf-creating-a-subclass-of-immigrants-with-deferred
-action-status-denial-of-health-care-as-an-enduring-disability (addressing the
lack of access to health insurance by individuals with Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parental Accountability
(DAPA) status).
27. The Medicare Conditions of Participation are federal regulations that
hospitals must meet in order to participate in the Medicare Program and
receive reimbursement for providing hospital services to Medicare
beneficiaries. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.1–.104 (2014); id. § 482.1(a)(1)(i)
(“Hospitals participating in Medicare must meet certain specified
requirements.”); id. § 488.3(a), (a)(2) (“In order to be approved for participation
in or coverage under the Medicare program, a prospective provider . . . must
. . . be in compliance with the applicable conditions . . . prescribed in [42 C.F.R.
P]art 482 . . . .”); id. § 489.53(a), (a)(1) (“[The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services] may terminate the agreement with any provider if CMS
finds that . . . [the hospital] . . . is not complying with the provisions of [Title
18 of the Social Security Act and its implementing regulations] or with the
provisions of the [participating-provider] agreement.”).
28. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 482.13(e)(8)(i).
31. Id. § 482.13(e)(5).
32. Id. § 482.13(e)(8)(i)(A).
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the order, all seclusion interventions must be discontinued at
33
the earliest possible time. Hospital leadership is responsible
for creating a culture that supports each patient’s right to be
free from unnecessary seclusion and for developing,
implementing, and evaluating systems and processes that are
34
designed to eliminate inappropriate seclusion use.
Hospitals that violate the Conditions of Participation risk
losing Medicare-participating provider status, resulting in an
inability to receive federal reimbursement for providing care to
35
government program beneficiaries. Because most hospitals
rely heavily on Medicare and Medicaid dollars, federal health
care program exclusion is considered a “financial death
36
sentence for hospitals.” The Office of the Inspector General of
the federal Department of Health and Human Services also has
the authority to impose on non-compliant hospitals civil
37
monetary penalties that accrue on a daily basis. This Article is
the first piece of legal scholarship to propose a similar set of
legally enforceable standards governing the use of seclusion in
immigration detention centers.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the use
38
and abuse of seclusion in U.S. immigration detention centers.
Every day, hundreds of detainees are secluded in small,
39
windowless cells for days, weeks, and months at a time, with
33. Id. § 482.13(e), (e)(9).
34. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL, APPENDIX A––SURVEY
PROTOCOL, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES FOR HOSPITALS, reg.
A-0154 (Rev. 122, Sept. 26, 2014).
35. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.1(b) (“[T]he provisions of this part serve as the
basis of survey activities for the purpose of determining whether a hospital
qualifies for a provider agreement under Medicare and Medicaid.”).
36. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., A ROADMAP FOR NEW PHYSICIANS: AVOIDING MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE, SPEAKER NOTE SET 13 (2014),
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/roadmap_speaker_notes.pdf
[hereinafter SPEAKER NOTE SET] (“The effect of exclusion is very serious.
Excluded [providers] may not bill for treating Medicare and Medicaid patients,
nor may their services be billed indirectly through an employer or a group
practice. Because of this prohibition, some refer to exclusion as a ‘financial
death sentence’ for any health care provider.”).
37. See infra notes 285–86 and accompanying text (discussing enforceable
civil penalties).
38. See infra Part I.
39. Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held in Solitary Cells,
Often for Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
03/24/us/immigrants-held-in-solitary-cells-often-for-weeks.html (“On any given
day, about 300 immigrants are held in solitary confinement at the 50 largest
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no access to visitors and little or no recreation. Reasons for
the intervention include coercion, convenience, discipline,
retaliation, a lack of space, an inability to provide mental
health care, an inability to protect vulnerable detainees, and a
41
lack of other institutional solutions.
Part I also reviews the research investigating the impact of
42
seclusion on detainee physical and mental health. This
research shows that seclusion has a profoundly negative impact
on detainee health and wellbeing, especially with respect to
detainees who have preexisting physical and mental health
43
Seclusion is associated with a number of
conditions.
physiological effects, including heart palpitations, diaphoresis,
insomnia, back and other joint pains, deterioration of eyesight,
44
poor appetite, weight loss, lethargy, weakness, and tremors.
Seclusion is also associated with a number of psychological
effects, including anxiety, depression, anger, cognitive

detention facilities that make up the sprawling patchwork of holding centers
nationwide overseen by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials
. . . .”).
40. See, e.g., DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: THEO LACY
DETENTION CENTER, CALIFORNIA 5 (2012) [hereinafter THEO LACY DETENTION
CENTER REPORT] (“[D]isciplinary segregation at Theo Lacy means that a
person is housed 24 hours a day in a small isolation room with no access to
visitors and no recreation. They are released briefly every other day for a
shower.”).
41. See infra Part I.
42. See infra Part I.
43. See, e.g., SHARON SHALEV, A SOURCEBOOK ON SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT 10 (2008) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK] (“There is unequivocal
evidence that solitary confinement has a profound impact on health and
wellbeing, particularly for those with pre-existing mental health disorders
. . . .”); id. at 10–24 (providing an in-depth review of studies investigating the
negative health consequences of seclusion); Juan E. Mendez, Preface to
SHARON SHALEV, SOURCEBOOK ON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 1, 2 (Spanish ed.
2014) [hereinafter Mendez, Special Rapporteur on Torture] (“There is strong
evidence suggesting that solitary confinement, even for a short period,
adversely impacts on mental health. The gravity of these impacts increases
with the passage of time and they may eventually become irreversible.
Research in this field has established that solitary confinement can cause
mental illnesses, including a syndrome described as ‘prison psychosis[,]’ . . .
which manifests in symptoms including anxiety, depression, anger, cognitive
disturbances, paranoia and psychosis, and can lead to self-harm.”); Urbina &
Rentz, supra note 39 (“Paranoia, depression, memory loss and self-mutilation
are not uncommon.”); see also SHARITA GRUBERG, CTR. FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS, DIGNITY DENIED: LGBT IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION
DETENTION 6 (2013) (referencing the negative health consequences of
seclusion).
44. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43, at 15.
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disturbances, perceptual distortions, paranoia, and psychosis.
In light of these and other associations, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur has stated that seclusion can constitute
torture in certain circumstances, and that seclusion should
never be used with respect to detainees who have mental
46
disabilities, especially in light of the high rate of self-harm
47
and suicidal behaviors among secluded populations. Part I
argues that the justifications proffered for seclusion are rarely
proportionate to the intervention’s dangers and fall short of
both international human rights and federal hospital patients’
48
rights standards governing the imposition of seclusion.
Part II reveals that seclusion-related injuries and deaths
used to be common in other contexts, especially the health care
49
context. From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, hundreds of
seclusion-related deaths occurred across the country in
psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric units of general hospitals, and
other health care facilities. Part II explains how these deaths
led researchers, patient safety advocates, and others to study
and publicize the high rates of seclusion-related deaths and to
identify factors believed to contribute to these deaths, including
the failure of hospital staff to attempt less restrictive measures
to calm patients down before imposing seclusion, the use of
seclusion by staff members untrained in safe seclusion
practices, the failure of staff to comply with relevant state
statutes and regulations limiting the length of time that
45. Id. at 15–16.
46. Mendez, Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 43, at 2
(“Depending on the reasons for its use, the conditions through which it is
imposed, its duration, the gravity of its effects and other circumstances,
solitary confinement can amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or
even to torture.”); id. at 3 (“Solitary confinement should never be imposed to
minors, pregnant or breastfeeding women, or persons with mental disability.
In such cases, in view of the particular vulnerability of the detained person,
solitary confinement always amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, or torture.”).
47. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Inmate Suicide Linked to Solitary, USA
TODAY (Dec. 27, 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-12
-27-inmate-suicides_x.htm (reporting that sixty-nine percent of California’s
prison suicides occurred in units where inmates are isolated for twenty-three
hours a day; further reporting that most of Texas’s prison suicides involved
inmates who were in some type of solitary confinement); see also
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43, at 17 (“[T]here is compelling anecdotal evidence
that the prevalence of [self-harm] in segregation and isolations units is
particularly high.”).
48. See infra Part I.
49. See infra Part II.
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patients may be placed in seclusion, and the use of seclusion
without adequate recognition of suicide hazards.
Part II further explores the responses to these deaths by
public and private agencies and associations, including the U.S.
General Accounting Office, the U.S. Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration, and the National
50
Association of State Mental Health Program Directors. These
organizations issued reports formally calling for the reduction
and eventual elimination of the seclusion intervention in the
health care context. Part II shows that health law reform
quickly followed, including new federal regulations strictly
governing the imposition of seclusion in the health care context.
Compelled by the threat of civil monetary penalties, exclusion
from the Medicare Program, and private lawsuits, Part II
reveals how many hospitals and other health care institutions
quickly reduced and attempted to eliminate their use of the
seclusion intervention altogether. Finally, Part II evaluates
post-law reform studies reporting associations between the
reduction in seclusion and restraint use and lower numbers of
patient injuries and deaths, shorter hospital lengths of stay,
decreased rates of re-hospitalization, lower rates of medication
usage, lower costs, higher levels of patient functioning at the
51
time of discharge, and increased patient satisfaction.
Thus far, proposals to reform the U.S. immigration
detention and deportation system have relied heavily on
52
constitutional law and international human rights theories.
Part III takes a novel approach by proposing to correct the
abuse of the seclusion intervention in immigration detention by
drawing on established frameworks in health law and
53
bioethics. Specifically, Part III highlights the philosophical
differences between federal health laws that are designed to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of hospital patients and
ICE’s unenforceable standards that fail to protect immigration
54
detainees. Part III offers nine specific recommendations that,
if promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security into

50. See infra Part II.
51. See, e.g., SAMHSA, BUSINESS CASE, supra note 20, at 1–28 (citing
studies reporting cost savings and other patient benefits associated with
reductions in restraint and seclusion use).
52. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 74–114.
53. See infra Part III.
54. See infra Part III.
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federal regulations, would improve the health, safety, and
55
welfare of immigration detainees.
I. IMMIGRATION DETENTION: UNDER FIRE
The United States is home to more than 250 immigration
56
detention centers that are designed to confine one or more
57
aliens pending a determination regarding whether each alien
is to be removed from the United States or, once a final order of
removal has been entered, the alien’s return transportation to
58
her country of citizenship. In 2013, the most recent year for
which data are available from the federal Office of Immigration
55. See infra Part III.
56. See, e.g., DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE, ONE YEAR
LATER: THE ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 1
(2013) [hereinafter EXPOSE & CLOSE: ONE YEAR LATER], http://www
.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose
-1yrlaternov13_0.pdf (referencing the “network of over 250 prisons operated by
federal, state, and local governments, as well as by private corporations”);
LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE SERV., FROM PERSECUTION TO PRISON:
CHILD AND FAMILY DETENTION 1 (2014), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/08/LIRS-Family-Detention-Backgrounder-140807.pdf (referencing the
“nationwide system of over 250 immigration detention facilities”); Ted
Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/
little-known-immigration-mandate-keeps-detention-beds-full
(referencing
“some 250 facilities across the country”).
57. An alien is defined as a person who is not a United States citizens or
national. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2014).
58. See id. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an
alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is
to be removed from the United States. Except as provided . . . and pending
such decision, the Attorney General—(1) may continue to detain the arrested
alien . . . .”); id. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . when
an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from
the United States within a period of 90 days (‘referred to as the removal
period’) . . . . During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the
alien.”); OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 2 (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter
2013 DHS IMMIGRATION STATISTICS] (defining detention as the “physical
custody of an alien in order to hold him/her, pending a determination on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States or awaiting return
transportation to his/her country of citizenship after a final order of removal
has been entered”). Reasons for alien detention include, but are not limited to,
being in the United States without proper documentation, overstaying a visa,
being charged or convicted of certain crimes, having been previously deported
(or ordered to leave the country) and having returned to (or having remained
in) the United States, and the seeking of political asylum by refugees. See, e.g.,
Cody Mason, Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention,
SENTENCING PROJECT, July 2012, at 2 (providing background information
regarding immigration and customs enforcement).
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Statistics, ICE detained nearly 441,000 aliens, ninety
percent of whom were nationals of Mexico, Guatemala,
61
Honduras, and El Salvador.
The largest detention center in the United States opened
62
its doors in December 2014 in Dilley, Texas. Spread across
fifty acres and built to hold up to 2,400 individuals, the South
Texas Family Residential Center is run by Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA), a private, for-profit corrections
system that designs, finances, builds, owns, and manages
detention centers, prisons, and jails on behalf of ICE and other
63
federal, state, and local agencies. CCA, whose annual revenue
64
is upwards of $1.8 billion, operates more than sixty detention
facilities across the United States and manages more than
65
80,000 detainees and inmates. CCA and other for-profit
66
and Community
companies, including the GEO Group

59. ICE, the largest investigative agency in the Department of Homeland
Security, enforces federal immigration laws as part of its homeland security
mission. See Who We Are, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov
(last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
60. 2013 DHS IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 58, at 1, 5 tbl.5, 6
(“ICE detained 440,557 aliens during 2013, a decrease of 8 percent from 2012.
. . .”).
61. Id. at 5 tbl.5, 6 (providing numbers and percentages of aliens detained
by country of citizenship).
62. South Texas Migrant Detention Center, the Nation’s Largest, Opens,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/
local-news/20141215-homeland-secretary-opens-migrant-family-detention
-center-in-south-texas.ece (discussing the opening of the South Texas Family
Residential Center); Press Release, Immigration & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t
Homeland Sec, ICE’s New Family Detention Center in Dilley, Texas To Open
in December (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ices-new
-family-detention-center-dilley-texas-open-december.
63. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AM., CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA
(CCA) AT A GLANCE: AMERICA’S LEADERSHIP IN PARTNERSHIP CORRECTIONS 1
[hereinafter CCA AT A GLANCE] (providing background information regarding
CCA); John Burnett, How Will a Small Town in Arizona Manage an ICE
Facility in Texas?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/
10/28/359411980/how-will-a-small-town-in-arizona-manage-an-ice-facility-in
-texas (discussing the history of the South Texas Family Residential Center
and its operation by CCA).
64. ACLU OF GA., PRISONERS OF PROFIT: IMMIGRANTS AND DETENTION IN
GEORGIA 12 (2012) [hereinafter PRISONERS OF PROFIT] (stating that CCA’s
annual revenue in 2010 was $1.7 billion).
65. CCA AT A GLANCE, supra note 63.
66. Welcome to the GEO Group, GEO GRP., http://www.geogroup.com (last
visited Apr. 20, 2016) (providing information regarding the global detention,
corrections, and reentry services provided by the GEO Group).
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67

Education Centers, contract with ICE to provide detention
services. ICE also obtains detention services from the federal
68
Bureau of Prisons and state and local jails in addition to
69
running its own detention centers.
Over the past decade, ICE has been under heavy fire by
civil rights, human rights, and immigrant advocacy groups, as
well as by legal scholars, law school-based immigration clinics,
70
and other stakeholders, for its treatment of detainees. In
March 2009, for example, Amnesty International released a

67. CEC Corrections, CMTY. EDUC. CTRS., https://www.cecintl.com/secure
.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (explaining that CEC contracts with ICE
among other federal, state, and local agencies, to provide detention services);
CEC Locations, CMTY. EDUC. CTRS, https://www.cecintl.com/facilities_facilities
.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (listing detention facilities operated by CEC
in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas).
68. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Service Agreement Between the U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations, and Karnes County, Texas,
Art. I(A) (Dec. 2010) (obligating Karnes County, Texas, to provide detention
services to detainees at the Karnes County Civil Detention Facility located in
Karnes City, Texas). Even though immigration detention is a civil, not
criminal, form of detention, immigration detainees are frequently housed with
criminals in Federal Bureau of Prisons facilities as well as in state and local
jails. See, e.g., Detention Management, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Nov.
10, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/detention-management (“Nearly 67
percent of the ICE detained population are housed in local or state facilities,
17 percent are housed in contract detention facilities, 13 percent are housed in
ICE-owned facilities (service processing centers), and 3 percent are housed in
Bureau of Prisons facilities, which are funded either through congressional
appropriations to the bureau or through ICE reimbursement.”).
69. See, e.g., EXPOSE & CLOSE: ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 56
(referencing the network of detention centers “operated by federal, state, and
local governments, as well as by private corporations”); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOM ENFORCEMENT
DETENTION BEDSPACE MANAGEMENT, OIG Rep. No. 09–52, at 2 (2009) (“ICE
houses detainees in eight ICE-owned and operated service processing centers,
seven contract detention facilities owned and operated by private-sector
businesses on behalf of ICE, or more than 350 state and local government
facilities through intergovernmental service agreements.”).
70. See, e.g., Kate Linthicum, Immigration Detention Center on Terminal
Island Deemed Unsafe Again, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www
.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ice-facility-20141217-story.html
(“ICE’s
detention practices have previously come under fire . . . .”); Megan Sweas,
Immigration Officials Call on Churches, Nonprofits To Help Detained
Families, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP. (June 10, 2014), http://ncronline.org/blogs/
immigration-and-church/immigration-officials-call-churches-nonprofits-help
-detained-families (“ICE has been releasing families from custody because of a
lack of detention facilities, but it has come under fire in recent weeks for its
treatment of released migrants.”).
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report highlighting U.S. detainees’ lack of basic human rights.
In that report, Amnesty International argued that, “The use of
detention as a tool to combat unauthorized migration falls
short of international human rights law, which contains a clear
presumption against detention. Everyone has the right to
liberty, freedom of movement, and the right not to be
72
arbitrarily detained.”
State affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) have also issued a series of reports condemning ICE
and its contracted detention service providers for their
73
treatment of detainees. In 2008, the ACLU of Massachusetts
issued a report tracking the experiences of forty detainees in
Massachusetts and concluding that, “ICE’s system of vast,
unchecked federal powers opens the door to violations of basic
74
human rights.” In 2010, the New York Civil Liberties Union
issued a report analyzing one year of grievances filed by
detainees housed in the Varick Federal Detention Facility, New
75
York’s only federal immigration detention center. The New
York report concluded that, “the federal government has failed
in its responsibilities to provide adequate care to detainees
76
housed in immigration facilities.”
In 2011, the ACLU of Arizona issued a report documenting
115 face-to-face interviews with detainees and more than 500
77
The Arizona report
grievances authored by detainees.
highlighted systematic civil and human rights abuses in
several key areas, including deficient physical and mental
health care, abusive treatment of detainees, inhumane
78
conditions in local jails, and an overall lack of accountability.
In 2012, the ACLU of Georgia issued a similar report detailing
detainee conditions in Georgia, highlighting “serious concerns
about violations of detainees’ due process rights, inadequate
71. AMNESTY INT’L,
IN THE USA 3 (2009).

JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION

72. Id.
73. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 74–80.
74. ACLU OF MASS., DETENTION AND DEPORTATION IN THE AGE OF ICE:
IMMIGRANTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 5 (2008).
75. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, VOICES OF VARICK: DETAINEE
GRIEVANCES AT NEW YORK CITY’S ONLY FEDERAL IMMIGRATION DETENTION
FACILITY 1 (2010).
76. Id.
77. ACLU OF ARIZ., THEIR OWN WORDS: ENDURING ABUSE IN ARIZONA
IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTERS 3 (2011).
78. Id.
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living conditions, inadequate medical and mental health care,
79
and abuse of power by those in charge.” In December 2014,
the ACLU of Southern California issued a report concluding
that the overwhelming majority of detainees should be released
on bond or other conditions of release and that “their prolonged
detention—at great personal cost to themselves and their
families and massive financial cost to taxpayers—[is]
80
unnecessary.”
Amnesty International and the ACLU are not the only
organizations that have critiqued the U.S. immigration
detention and deportation system. In 2012, Detention Watch
Network, a national coalition of organizations and individuals
working to expose and challenge the injustices associated with
81
immigration detention and deportation, released ten “Expose
and Close” reports documenting human rights violations
occurring in immigration detention centers located across the
82
United States. The reports focused on the poor conditions of
83
detainees in Baker County Jail in Macclenny, Florida; Etowah
84
County Jail in Gadsden, Alabama; Houston Processing Center
85
in Houston, Texas; Hudson County Jail in Kearny, New
86
87
Jersey; Irwin County Detention Center in Ocilla, Georgia;

79. PRISONERS OF PROFIT, supra note 64.
80. ACLU OF S. CAL., RESTORING DUE PROCESS: HOW BOND HEARINGS
UNDER RODRIGUEZ V. ROBBINS HAVE HELPED END ARBITRARY IMMIGRATION
DETENTION 1 (2014) .
81. Who We Are, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www
.detentionwatchnetwork.org/whoweare (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
82. Detention Watch Network Expose and Close Reports on 10 of the Worst
Immigrant Prisons in the US, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www
.detentionwatchnetwork.org/ExposeAndClose (last visited Apr. 20, 2016)
(linking to all ten reports).
83. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: BAKER COUNTY JAIL,
FLORIDA (2012) [hereinafter BAKER COUNTY JAIL REPORT], http://www
.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/DWN%20Expose%
20and%20Close%20Baker%20County.pdf.
84. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: ETOWAH COUNTY
JAIL, ALABAMA (2012) [hereinafter ETOWAH COUNTY JAIL REPORT], http://www
.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/DWN%20Expose%
20and%20Close%20Etowah%20County.pdf.
85. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: HOUSTON
PROCESSING CENTER, TEXAS (2012) [hereinafter HOUSTON PROCESSING
CENTER REPORT], http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/
reports/DWN%20Expose%20and%20Close%20Houston.pdf.
86. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: HUDSON COUNTY
JAIL, NEW JERSEY (2012) http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/
files/reports/DWN%20Expose%20and%20Close%20Hudson%20County.pdf.
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88

Pinal County Jail in Florence, Arizona; Polk County Adult
89
Detention Facility in Livingston, Texas; Stewart Detention
90
Center in Lumpkin, Georgia; Theo Lacy Detention Center in
91
Orange, California; and Tri-County Detention Center in Ullin,
92
Illinois. The conditions in these ten facilities were so poor that
Detention Watch Network sent a letter to President Obama in
November 2012 asking him to close all ten facilities and to
improve the health, safety, and welfare of all detainees in the
93
United States.
The following year, Detention Watch Network released a
follow-up report re-reviewing the conditions in the ten facilities
exposed the prior year and highlighting the poor conditions of
94
detainees in additional facilities. Detention Watch Network’s
2013 report concluded that, “Immigrants in detention are
denied basic needs . . . . They are subject to sub-standard
medical care and denial of specialty care, resulting in prolonged
injury, sickness and/or death. There is no accountability for
87. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: IRWIN COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER, GEORGIA (2012) [hereinafter IRWIN COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER REPORT], http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/
detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-irwinnov12.pdf.
88. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: PINAL COUNTY JAIL,
ARIZONA (2012) [hereinafter PINAL COUNTY JAIL REPORT], http://www
.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose
-pinalnov12.pdf.
89. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: POLK COUNTY
DETENTION FACILITY, TEXAS
(2012) [hereinafter POLK COUNTY
DETENTION FACILITY REPORT], http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/
detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-polknov12.pdf.
90. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: STEWART
DETENTION CENTER, GEORGIA (2012), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/
sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-stewartnov12.pdf.
91. THEO LACY DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note 40.
92. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: TRI-COUNTY
DETENTION
CENTER,
ILLINOIS
(2012)
[hereinafter
TRI-COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER REPORT], http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/
detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-tricountynov12.pdf.
93. Letter from Int’l, Nat’l, Reg’l, State, and Local Orgs. to President
Barack Obama at 1, 3, (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork
.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/ec-obamaletter.pdf
(“[W]e,
the
undersigned civil and human rights organizations, call on you to . . . close at
least ten facilities that advocates have identified as among the worst of
immigration detention facilities across the country. . . . We also call on the
Administration to fulfill our international obligations and your promise for
humane and just treatment for everyone. . . . The safety, health and even the
lives of thousands of immigrants, and the wellbeing of their families, depends
on it.”).
94. See EXPOSE & CLOSE: ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 56.
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95

those who suffer needlessly behind bars.” Most recently, in
September 2014, Detention Watch Network issued a report
focusing on the poor conditions of detainees at the Artesia
96
Family Residential Center in Artesia, New Mexico. Among
other issues, the New Mexico report detailed the center’s
failure to meet basic child welfare guidelines and its inability to
97
provide minimum physical and mental health care.
Leading American journalists also have criticized the lack
of concern for detainee health, safety, and welfare. In May
2008, staff writers at the Washington Post published a series of
four articles detailing the medical neglect and other
98
substandard conditions suffered by U.S. detainees. Based on
interviews and thousands of internal documents, including emails, memos, autopsy reports, and medical records, the series’
writers highlighted the plight of detainees with mental illness:
“While tens of thousands of detainees inside immigration
detention centers endure substandard medical care, people
with mental illness are relegated to the darkest and most
99
neglected corners of the system . . . .”
In April 2013, the Editorial Board of the New York Times
boldly stated that “ICE’s detention system . . . is not a model of
humane incarceration. It’s a ramshackle network of private and
public lockups, prone to abuses and lacking legally enforceable
100
The Houston
standards for how detainees are treated.”
Chronicle published a similar article in August 2014 likening
101
immigration detention centers to deportation factories. That
same month, the Los Angeles Times reported the story of an

95. Id.
96. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: ARTESIA FAMILY
DETENTION CENTER, NEW MEXICO (2014), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork
.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose_close_-_artesia_family_
residential_center_nm_2014.pdf.
97. Id. at 7–10.
98. See Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Careless Detention, WASH. POST,
May 11, 12, 13, & 14, 2008, at A1 (documenting detention centers’ medical
neglect of detainees, failure to provide health care, high rates of detainee
suicide, and practice of drugging detainees prior to deportation).
99. Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Careless Detention: Suicides Point to
Gaps in Treatment, WASH. POST, May 13, 2008, at A1.
100. Immigrants in Solitary, supra note 7.
101. David McCumber & Susan Carroll, Immigrant Detention Centers
Decried by Critics as “Deportation Factories,” HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Immigrant-detention-centers
-decried-by-critics-as-5684471.php.
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eleven-year-old boy who, as a United States citizen, was
102
mistakenly placed in ICE custody for more than one month.
Legal scholars and other academics also have spent a
considerable amount of time identifying, analyzing, and
proposing solutions to concerns associated with the U.S.
immigration detention and deportation system. These concerns
103
104
human rights concerns, ,
include due process concerns,
102. Cindy Carcamo, Child’s Detention Despite Citizenship Reveals
Immigration Case Woes, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/
world/mexico-americas/la-na-citizen-detained-20140815-story.html (“The boy
spent more than a month at the detention center in Artesia, N.M., before an
immigration attorney who happened to be visiting the facility discovered his
status last week.”).
103. See, e.g., Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on
Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 363 (2014) (using
Supreme Court due process doctrine to argue that “the mandatory detention
statute should be construed to govern detention for no longer than six months,
after which time a bond hearing should be required”); David Cole, In Aid of
Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003,
1008 (2002) (identifying several aspects of INS’s then-current detention
policies and practices that the author believed violated due process); Jennifer
Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and
the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 476 (2013)
(“[T]his Article argues that the stipulated order of removal program, as
implemented thus far, violates due process, and offers suggestions for
reform.”); Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right
to Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 929
(2014) (arguing that “courts should recognize a substantive due process right
to competence in removal proceedings” that “would prevent those found
mentally incompetent from being deported”); Mark Noferia, Cascading
Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily
Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L.
63, 63 (2012) (“In this Article, I call this the cascading constitutional
deprivation of wrongful detention and deportation. I argue, under modern
procedural due process theories, that this cascading constitutional deprivation
warrants appointed counsel, notwithstanding traditional plenary power over
immigration laws.”); Faiza W. Sayed, Note, Challenging Detention: Why
Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process than “Enemy Combatants” and Why
They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1833 (2011) (arguing that
“immigrant detainees deserve more process to protect against erroneous
detention” and proposing “ways to reform immigrant challenges to mandatory
detention”).
104. See, e.g., Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International
Human Rights Law To Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 249 (2013) (“[T]he Article demonstrates how the
application of international human rights law standards can bring rationality
and humanity to US immigration detention by revitalizing the right to liberty,
which constitutes a core conception in both international human rights law
and US law.”); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Invisible Spaces and
Invisible Lives in Immigration Detention, 57 HOW. L.J. 869, 871 (2014) (“These
individuals are not just migrants ineligible for the privileges of full
participation in civic life. Rather, detained migrants have been moved, by law,
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105

empirical concerns, and concerns regarding the high rates of
all types of detainee abuse, including physical, sexual, and
106
Still other scholars have critiqued
emotional abuse.
107
immigration detention’s penal nature as well as its flawed
outside the law, and rendered ineligible for basic human dignities.”); Susan
Marx, Throwing Away the Key: The Constitutionality of the Indefinite
Detention of Inadmissible Aliens, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2004)
(analyzing “issues of public policy and human rights as they pertain to
indefinite detention” and concluding that “such detention is contrary to
international human rights laws and agreements, as well as to public policy
within the United States”); Shana Tabak & Rachel Levitan, LGBTI Migrants
in Immigration Detention: A Global Perspective, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 2
(2014) (“Although all detainees are vulnerable to human rights abuses, LGBTI
detainees are particularly susceptible to heightened levels of physical and
mental abuse.”).
105. See Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant
Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 337 (2014) (shedding “light on the
doctrinal controversies surrounding stays of removal” by empirically analyzing
1,646 cases “in all the circuits that hear immigration appeals” and finding that
“the circuit courts denied stays of removal in about half of the appeals that
were ultimately granted, an alarming type of error that could result in people
being errantly deported to countries where they risk persecution or torture”).
105. See Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant
Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 337 (2014) (shedding “light on the
doctrinal controversies surrounding stays of removal” by empirically analyzing
1,646 cases “in all the circuits that hear immigration appeals” and finding that
“the circuit courts denied stays of removal in about half of the appeals that
were ultimately granted, an alarming type of error that could result in people
being errantly deported to countries where they risk persecution or torture”).
106. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-38, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD STRENGTHEN DHS EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS SEXUAL ABUSE (2013) (reviewing sexual abuse that occurs in
immigration detention); Maunica Sthanki, Deconstructing Detention:
Structural Impunity and the Need for an Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REV.
447, 447 (2013) (“A culture of abuse and ‘othering’ of immigrant detainees has
resulted in numerous reports of dehumanizing physical, sexual, and medical
abuse.”); Catherine Rentz, How Much Sexual Abuse Gets “Lost in Detention”?,
PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how
-much-sexual-abuse-gets-lost-in-detention (referencing the hundreds of
allegations of sexual abuse that have been filed against guards and other staff
members of immigration detention centers located across the United States).
107. See, e.g., Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 75, 75 (2013) (“This Article is about curbing the most problematic
excesses of the ‘crimmigration complex.’ . . . [C]rimmigration complex refers to
the expanding array of government agencies and private contractors using the
expensive artillery of criminal sanctions to enforce civil immigration law.”);
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment,
61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1346 (2014) (“This Article . . . contends that
immigration detention––apart from the deportation that often results—itself
constitutes penal incarceration. In particular, legislation enacted over roughly
fifteen years in the 1980s and 1990s indicates a palpable desire to wield
immigration detention as a tool in fighting the nation’s burgeoning war on
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108

institutional design. Student attorneys affiliated with law
school immigration clinics also have authored reports exposing
substandard detainee conditions, ICE policy violations, and
instances of coercion by ICE officers in particular detention
centers, as well as briefs and position papers critiquing various
109
immigration detention laws, policies, and practices.
This Article builds on this literature with a very specific
focus: the use and abuse of the seclusion intervention in U.S.
immigration detention centers. By seclusion, this Article refers
drugs by penalizing and stigmatizing criminal behavior.”); César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1460
(discussing “the willingness with which United States law and society [has]
turned to penal norms to address social phenomena deemed problematic”).
108. See, e.g., Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and
Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 139 (2013) (examining
immigration detention through the lens of “institutional design” by examining
“how the legal institutions and administrative rules governing immigration
detention affect the government's ability and incentives to access the
information necessary to achieve its purported goals”).
109. See BAKER COUNTY JAIL REPORT, supra note 83, at 1 (stating that
research for the report was conducted, in part, by students from the Florida
Coastal School of Law Immigrant Rights Clinic during a visit to Baker County
Jail in June 2012); IMMIGRATION CLINIC, THOMAS & MACK LEGAL CLINIC,
WILLIAM S. BOYD SCH. OF LAW, UNIV. OF NEV., LAS VEGAS, THE CONDITIONS
OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN NEVADA: A REPORT ON THE HENDERSON
DETENTION CENTER (2013), http://law.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/clinic_
immigration_hendersondetentioncenterreport_2013_11_19.pdf (reporting on
conditions at the Henderson Detention Center in Henderson, Nevada);
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, SECOND
CHANCES FOR ALL: WHY ORANGE COUNTY PROBATION SHOULD STOP
CHOOSING DEPORTATION OVER REHABILITATION FOR IMMIGRANT YOUTH
(2013),
http://www.law.uci.edu/academics/real-life-learning/clinics/UCILaw_
SecondChances_dec2013.pdf (analyzing the Orange County Probation
Department’s policy of referring immigrant children in its care to ICE; arguing
that this policy violates confidentiality laws, undermines the rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile justice system, impedes community policing efforts,
unlawfully entangles its officers in federal immigration enforcement and
diverts county resources; and recommending possible solutions to address
these harms); JAYASHRI SRIKANTIAH ET AL., STANFORD LAW SCH. IMMIGRANTS
RIGHTS’ CLINIC & CTR. FOR JUSTICE & INT’L LAW, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND FAMILY UNITY ADDRESSING U.S.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES ISSUED AFTER SUBMISSION OF PETITIONERS’
REPORT (2013), https://law.stanford.edu/publications/supplemental-report-on
-prosecutorial-discretion-and-family-unity-addressing-u-s-government-policies
-issued-after-submission-of-petitioners-report (challenging a U.S. immigration
policy directive for its failure to consider family unity and the rights of the
child and arguing that these failures violate international human rights
norms); Report from the Front: Law School’s Immigration Clinic Director
Visits Federal Detention Facility, CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM., http://www.law.edu/
2014-Fall/Report-from-the-Front-Law-Schools-Immigration-Clinic-Director
-Visits-Federal-Detention-Facility.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
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to the involuntary confinement of a detainee alone—away from
the general detention population—in a cell or other room from
110
which the detainee is physically prevented from leaving. The
term is intentionally used to encompass a variety of practices
111
and places referred to in the detention context as segregation,
112
113
disciplinary segregation,
administrative segregation,
114
separation, confinement, solitary confinement, isolation, “the
hole,” the secure housing unit, and the special management
115
unit. As discussed in more detail below, detention centers
offer a range of justifications for their frequent use of seclusion.
This Article argues that these justifications are rarely
proportionate to the dangers of seclusion and fall short of
federal health law standards governing the imposition of
seclusion.

110. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(1)(ii) (2014) (establishing a similar definition
of seclusion in regulations governing hospitals); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122-1401(C)(59) (2016) (establishing a similar definition of seclusion in a regulation
governing Ohio-licensed psychiatric hospitals and units).
111. The National Immigrant Justice Center (NIJC) defines segregation as
the “practice of separating vulnerable individuals or those who have been
deemed dangerous to themselves or others from the general population in a
prison or detention facility.” NIJC, supra note 4, at 2.
112. ICE defines administrative segregation as “a non–punitive form of
separation from the general population for administrative reasons.” U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DIRECTIVE NO. 11065.1, REVIEW OF THE USE
OF SEGREGATION FOR ICE DETAINEES § 3.1, at 2 (Sept. 4, 2013).
113. ICE defines disciplinary segregation as “a punitive form of separation
from the general population for disciplinary reasons.” Id. § 3.2, at 2.
114. The United Nations Special Rapporteur defines solitary confinement
as the “physical and social isolation of individuals who are confined to their
cells for 22 to 24 hours a day.” Mendez, Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra
note 43, at 1. The NIJC uses the term solitary confinement to refer to
situations in which a detainee is locked in her cell for twenty-three or more
hours each day and “rarely” has any “contact with other people.” NIJC, supra
note 4, at 2.
115. See NIJC, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that solitary confinement also
may be called “isolation,” “the hole,” or “Secure Housing Unit” and that special
management units “are still used to hold detainees in solitary confinement”).
See generally SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43, §§ 1.1, 1.3 (providing detailed
information regarding the practice of solitary confinement and its harmful
consequences; explaining that “[i]solation, segregation, separation, cellular or
solitary confinement are some of the terms used to describe a form of
confinement where prisoners are held alone in their cell for up to 24 hours a
day”; and further stating that “[n]otwithstanding the different meanings
attached to each of these terms in different jurisdictions, the term ‘solitary
confinement’ will be used interchangeably with the terms ‘isolation’ and
‘segregation’ when describing regimes where prisoners do not have contact
with one another”); Manfred Nowak, Preface to SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43.
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A. DISPROPORTIONATE SECLUSION
Notwithstanding ICE’s detention guidelines, which
116
immigration
prohibit seclusion without justification,
detainees may be secluded for arbitrary reasons, minor rules
violations that are not serious enough to warrant seclusion, or,
really, for no reasons at all. During a July 2012 tour of the
Houston Processing Center in Houston, Texas (HPC), by
117
118
Grassroots Leadership and Texans United for Families,
guards admitted placing detainees with known mental health
119
conditions in seclusion for long periods of time for no reason.
When asked why certain detainees had been secluded, even the
120
HPC warden could provide no “answers.” Other detention
centers seclude detainees for reasons as simple as
121
overcrowding. At the Tri-County Detention Center in Ullin,
Illinois, for example, asylum seekers were secluded twenty122
three hours each day simply because “space was . . . scarce.”
Reviews of disciplinary reports and in-person interviews
with detainees at Baker County Jail in Macclenny, Florida
(Baker), from June 2012 revealed that detainees were secluded
for permitted conduct, such as complaining to ICE, as well as
minor rules violations, such as using curse words when
123
referring to conditions at Baker. Although the Baker County
Sheriff’s Office, which provides detention services through an
116. See infra Part III (discussing ICE’s current detention guidelines and
identifying their many limitations).
117. Grassroots Leadership is a non-profit organization working to end forprofit incarceration and reduce reliance on detention. About Us, GRASSROOTS
LEADERSHIP, http://grassrootsleadership.org/mission.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2016) (“Grassroots Leadership fights to end for-profit incarceration and reduce
reliance on criminalization and detention through direct action, organizing,
research, and public education.”).
118. Texans United for Families is a grassroots advocacy coalition fighting
to end immigration detention. See Texans United for Families, GRASSROOTS
LEADERSHIP, http://grassrootsleadership.org/programs/texans-united-families
(last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (“We support and coordinate . . . members in their
mission to fight back against immigrant detention and deportation close to
home.”).
119. HOUSTON PROCESSING CENTER REPORT, supra note 85, at 4
(containing an entire section titled “Inhumane Use of Solitary Confinement”).
120. Id. (concluding that HPC detainees were secluded “under quite
arbitrary rules with very little external oversight”).
121. See, e.g., SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43, at 26 (“Prisoners may also be
segregated due to prison overcrowding whilst waiting for space to become
available in a setting appropriate to their security classification.”).
122. TRI-COUNTY DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note 92, at 4.
123. BAKER COUNTY JAIL REPORT, supra note 83, at 5.
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Intergovernmental Service Agreement with ICE, allows
detainees a hearing regarding the reason for seclusion within
seven to ten days, Baker detainees may spend the full ten days
in seclusion waiting for that hearing, only to be found innocent
of the conduct proffered by the guard as a reason for
124
seclusion. In other detention centers, individuals are placed
in or returned to seclusion even after they are found innocent of
an alleged rules violation. Guards at Washoe County Jail in
Reno, Nevada, for example, continued to seclude a detainee
125
after he was found innocent of fighting. The written reason
given for the detainee’s continued seclusion was his “suspected
126
involvement in the incident.”
At Pinal County Jail in Florence, Arizona, detainees also
reported that they could be secluded for minor rules violations,
127
such as not making their beds. Similarly, guards at McHenry
County Correctional Facility in Woodstock, Illinois, secluded
one detainee for weeks because the detainee had an extra piece
of underclothing and because she placed her shampoo bottle on
128
a windowsill. Guards at Sherburne County Jail in Elk River,
Minnesota, secluded a detainee after finding some peanut
129
butter and a Kool-Aid packet back in her cell. Guards at the
Atlanta Pretrial Detention Center in Atlanta, Georgia, secluded
one detainee because he provided translation services to a
130
fellow detainee who had limited English proficiency. Guards
at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia
(Stewart), secluded a detainee for twenty-nine days after he
131
was caught providing information to the ACLU of Georgia.
Guards at Stewart also secluded detainees for complaining
about the drinking water and for refusing to work more than
132
Guards at Nobles County Jail in
eight hours a day.
Worthington, Minnesota, secluded detainees for “[f]ailure to
133
speak English when able.” Guards at Butler County Jail in
Hamilton, Ohio, placed one detainee in seclusion for an entire
month after she was found playing cards during church
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 5–6.
NIJC, supra note 4, at 18.
Id.
PINAL COUNTY JAIL REPORT, supra note 88, at 3.
NIJC, supra note 4, at 17.
Urbina & Rentz, supra note 39.
NIJC, supra note 4, at 17.
PRISONERS OF PROFIT, supra note 64, at 19.
Id. at 19, 57.
NIJC, supra note 4, at 18.
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134

At Irwin County Detention Center in Ocilla,
services.
Georgia, detainees grew so fearful of arbitrary seclusion that
they refused to complain about anything, even their own
135
emergency medical conditions.
B. SECLUSION IN LIEU OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE
In many immigration detention centers, seclusion is used
136
in lieu of providing mental health care. At Pinal County Jail
in Florence, Arizona, for example, detainees with serious
mental health conditions are secluded for no reason other than
137
their underlying mental illness. Once in seclusion, the mental
138
health of these detainees declines even further. At North
Georgia Detention Center (NGDC) in Gainesville, Georgia, an
inability to provide needed mental health care also is reported
139
to be a reason for seclusion. Although the National Detainee
Handbook states that “all potentially suicidal or severely
depressed individuals [shall be] treated with sensitivity and
receive proper referrals for assistance” and the NGDC Detainee
Handbook specifically encourages detainees with depression or
suicidal thoughts to speak with their Unit Managers, NGDC
detainees who follow these instructions are secluded rather
140
than treated.
At York County Prison in York, Pennsylvania, detainees
who are flagged as suicidal also are secluded rather than
141
At Mira Loma Detention Center in Lancaster,
treated.
134. Id. at 17.
135. See PRISONERS OF PROFIT, supra note 64, at 90 (“Many detainees we
spoke to [at Irwin] are afraid to voice their mental health concerns because
they believe that instead of receiving treatment, they will be placed in
segregation.”); see also IRWIN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note
87, at 1, 2, 4 (explaining that detainees “fear retaliation from facility staff if
they complain”).
136. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43, at 26 (“[P]risoners are also
sometimes held in solitary confinement because there are no appropriate
alternatives available for housing them. For example, mentally ill prisoners
may be isolated because there are no available secure hospital beds for
them.”).
137. PINAL COUNTY JAIL REPORT, supra note 88, at 6.
138. Id. at 6.
139. NIJC, supra note 4, at 16.
140. PRISONERS OF PROFIT, supra note 64, at 77 (quoting U.S DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL DETAINEE HANDBOOK (2007)); id. (“Those with
mental disabilities are often put in segregation in lieu of receiving
treatment.”); id. at 80 (“[I]nstead of receiving treatment, detainees are just put
in segregation.”).
141. NIJC, supra note 4, at 16.
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California, even a detainee’s belief that another detainee is
142
suicidal may lead to the seclusion of the second detainee.
Dora Schriro, the former Director of the Department of
Homeland Security’s Office of Detention Policy and Planning,
admits that, “[f]ew beds are available for in-house psychiatric
care for the mentally ill. Aliens with mental illnesses are often
143
assigned to segregation, as are aliens on suicide watch.”
C. SECLUSION IN LIEU OF PROTECTION
In many detention centers, individuals who are vulnerable
to abuse, including individuals who are lesbian, gay, bisexual,
144
or transgender (LGBT), are automatically and involuntarily
145
Guards at Ventura County Jail in Ventura,
secluded.
California, automatically seclude detainees who have “obvious
146
alternative life style[s].” Guards at Washoe County Jail in
Reno, Nevada, seclude detainees who have “overt homosexual
147
tendencies.” The story is the same for detainees at Cobb
County Jail in Marietta, Georgia, who are classified as “gender
challenged,” as well as detainees at Clinton County
Correctional Facility in McElhattan, Pennsylvania, who are
148
noted to be “overly . . . emotional.” At Theo Lacy Detention
Center in Orange, California, sexual minorities are secluded for
twenty-two hours each day without any type of individualized
assessment and without the opportunity to challenge the
149
seclusion order. The National Immigrant Justice Center also

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Stop Abuse of Detained LGBT Immigrants, NAT’L IMMIGRANT
JUSTICE
CTR.,
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/stop-abuse-detained-lgbt
-immigrants (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (reporting complaints of abuse and
neglect of LGBT detainees, including “sexual assault, denial of medical and
mental health treatment, arbitrary long-term solitary confinement, and
frequent harassment by officers and facility personnel”).
145. NIJC, supra note 4, at 19 (citation omitted).
146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. Id. (citation omitted).
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. Letter from Mary Meg McCarthy, Exec. Dir., Heartland Alliance, Nat’l
Immigrant Justice Ctr., & Eric Berndt, Supervising Attorney, Nat’l Asylum
P’ship on Sexual Minorities, to Officer Margo Schlanger, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, at 5 (Apr. 13, 2011), https://www
.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/OCRCL%20Global%
20Complaint%20Letter%20April%202011%20FINAL%20REDACTED.pdf.
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reports the seclusion of detainees who behave in an
150
“effeminate” manner.
In September 2013, ICE issued a directive addressing the
seclusion of individuals with special vulnerabilities and
clarifying that, “[p]lacement in segregation should occur only
when necessary and in compliance with applicable detention
standards. In particular, placement in administrative
segregation due to a special vulnerability should be used only
as a last resort and when no other viable housing options
151
exist.” Because the ICE directive fell short of mandating the
creation of viable housing options for vulnerable individuals,
detention centers continued to involuntarily seclude LGBT
detainees for months at a time, leading more than 100 LGBT
organizations across the country to send a letter to President
Obama in December 2014 asking for the release of LGBT
152
detainees. ICE responded by referencing its 2013 directive
and stating that it has a “strict zero tolerance policy for any
153
kind of abusive or inappropriate behavior in its facilities.” At
the time of this writing, however, LGBT detainees continue to
be involuntarily secluded for long periods of time due to
detention centers’ inability to provide safe housing options and
154
other protective services.
D. EXCESSIVE DURATION OF SECLUSION
Notwithstanding research showing that the gravity of
seclusion’s negative mental health impact increases with the
155
duration of seclusion, detainees in ICE custody are frequently
150. GRUBERG, supra note 43, at 7.
151. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 112, at 1; id. at 2,
§ 3.3 (defining individuals with “special vulnerabilities” to include individuals
“who would be susceptible to harm in general population due in part to their
sexual orientation or gender identity”).
152. Letter from Advocates for Informed Choice et al., to President Barack
Obama (Dec. 16, 2014) (referencing the months of solitary confinement of
Johanna, a transgender detainee from El Salvador).
153. Matthew Hendley, ICE Seeming To Have a Hard Time Housing Trans
Detainees, PHX. NEW TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/
news/ice-seeming-to-have-a-hard-time-housing-trans-detainees-6638309.
154. Id. (reporting the story of Marichuy Gamino, a transgender woman
who was raped at an immigration facility in Eloy, Arizona after she reported
harassment and staff took no protective measures; after she was raped, guards
involuntarily secluded her (but not the rapist)).
155. See, e.g., Mendez, Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 43, at 2
(“There is strong evidence suggesting that solitary confinement, even for a
short period, adversely impacts on mental health. The gravity of these impacts
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156

secluded for days, weeks, and months at a time. At Houston
Processing Center (HPC) in Houston, Texas, guards secluded
one detainee, a native of Africa, for more than three and one157
half months. A second detainee, a native of Tanzania, was
158
secluded at HPC for more than nine months. When the HPC
warden was asked by a representative of the grassroots
organization that toured the facility to identify the length of
time the Tanzanian had been secluded, the warden simply
159
responded, “[a] long time.”
Guards at Polk County Detention Facility in Livingston,
Texas, also seclude detainees for long periods of time—
anywhere from fifteen to thirty days—without adequate
160
justification. One twenty-eight-year-old detainee from Mexico
spent most of his two months at Polk in seclusion for
161
“misbehaving.” According to the detainee, staff made him
sign papers consenting to the long seclusion even though he
could not understand the consent forms, which were written in
162
When the detainee requested assistance during
English.
seclusion, staff dismissed his pleas and threatened to lengthen
163
his seclusion order by an additional ten-day period.
At Theo Lacy Detention Center in Orange, California,
guards explain that they “only” seclude detainees for ten days,
although each seclusion period can, somewhat confusingly, last
164
At Theo Lacy, secluded
up to a “maximum of 30 days.”
detainees spend twenty-four hours a day in a small room with
165
no access to visitors and no recreation.
increases with the passage of time and they may eventually become
irreversible.”).
156. See Peoples v. Fischer, No. 11 Civ. 2694 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013)
(challenging the constitutionality of the State of New York’s practice of placing
non-immigration prisoners in solitary confinement for long periods of time in a
civil rights lawsuit; arguing specifically that the “astonishingly long sentences
imposed on the Plaintiffs were arbitrary, grossly disproportionate to the
underlying misbehavior, had no legitimate penological justification, and
constituted a gratuitous infliction of wanton and unnecessary pain that fell far
short of evolving standards of decency”).
157. HOUSTON PROCESSING CENTER REPORT, supra note 85, at 4.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. POLK COUNTY DETENTION FACILITY REPORT, supra note 89, at 5.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. THEO LACY DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note 40.
165. Id.
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Long periods of seclusion are typical at other detention
centers as well. One detainee at Stewart Detention Center in
Lumpkin, Georgia, was secluded for more than three months,
while a second Stewart detainee was secluded for more than
166
five months. One detainee was secluded in detention centers
in Illinois and Wisconsin for a combined fifteen months before
167
he was granted asylum. One Texas detainee spent more than
168
Another
half of his nine-month detention in seclusion.
detainee was secluded for almost eight months by guards at the
169
Oakdale Federal Detention Center in Oakdale, Louisiana.
Interestingly, the Oakdale detainee had never violated a single
170
detention center rule.
Some detention centers have written policies that
expressly authorize long periods of seclusion. The Detainee
Handbook of Stewart Detention Center expressly permits
171
seclusion up to sixty days. Policies at Josephine County Jail
in Grants Pass, Oregon (Josephine), also permit sixty-day
172
periods of seclusion. Written policies at Yakima County Jail
in Yakima, Washington (Yakima) permit thirty-day periods of
173
seclusion. Neither Josephine nor Yakima requires a hearing
174
before the initiation of the seclusion intervention.
Although ICE standards require detention centers to
report instances of seclusion that last longer than thirty days,
many detention centers skirt this reporting requirement by
166. PRISONERS OF PROFIT, supra note 64, at 16, 68.
167. See Norma E. Loza, Abuse in Illinois Immigration Detention Centers:
Does the Current System Grant Human Rights to All Humans?, 17 PUB. INT. L.
REP. 143, 143 (2012).
168. Conditions of Detention: The Use of Isolation and Segregation,
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 12, 2010, 8:14 PM), http://phrtoolkits
.org/toolkits/asylum–detention/background/segregation (“When they put you in
‘el pozo’ [the hole or solitary confinement] you only have a little space. You
have a toilet and a little space where you can sleep. And there is a little place
where they put the food, but they throw it without caring. If you don’t take it
rapidly, they throw it, whether it is hot or cold. They don’t care. They throw it
as if you were an animal. It makes you lose control mentally. That is why I did
not come out so well, mentally. I would lose my mind—I would lose my mind
severely. I even wanted to commit suicide.”).
169. NIJC, supra note 4, at 23.
170. Id.
171. PRISONERS OF PROFIT, supra note 64, at 67 (“Depending on the nature
of the offense, per the Stewart Detainee Handbook, time spent in the
segregation unit can range from 24 hours to 60 days.”).
172. NIJC, supra note 4, at 21 .
173. Id.
174. Id.
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secluding detainees for twenty-nine days or less, followed by
one day of relief, followed by another lengthy period of
175
At Mira Loma Detention Center in Lancaster,
seclusion.
California, fifty-three detainees were secluded between May
176
Only four of these detainees were
2011 and May 2012.
secluded for longer than thirty days, while ten were secluded
177
between twenty-six and twenty-nine days. Guards secluded
one particular detainee for nineteen days, followed by one day
of relief, followed by a second nineteen-day period of
178
seclusion.
E. SELF-HARM AND SUICIDE IN SECLUSION
Research shows that seclusion has a profoundly negative
impact on detainee physical and mental health and that the
negative impact may be worse for detainees with preexisting
179
physical and mental health conditions. For example, research
shows that seclusion is associated with a number of
physiological effects, including heart palpitations, diaphoresis,
insomnia, back and other joint pains, deterioration of eyesight,
180
poor appetite, weight loss, lethargy, weakness, and tremors.
Research also shows that seclusion is associated with a number
of psychological effects, including anxiety, depression, anger,
cognitive disturbances, perceptual distortions, paranoia, and
181
In light of these and other negative health
psychosis.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43 (“There is unequivocal evidence that
solitary confinement has a profound impact on health and wellbeing,
particularly for those with pre-existing mental health disorders . . . .”); id. at
10–24 (providing an in-depth review of studies investigating the negative
health consequences of seclusion); Mendez, Special Rapporteur on Torture,
supra note 43, at 2 (“There is strong evidence suggesting that solitary
confinement, even for a short period, adversely impacts on mental health. The
gravity of these impacts increases with the passage of time and they may
eventually become irreversible. Research in this field has established that
solitary confinement can cause mental illnesses, including a syndrome
described as ‘prison psychosis[,]’ [] which manifests in symptoms including
anxiety, depression, anger, cognitive disturbances, paranoia and psychosis,
and can lead to self-harm.”); Urbina & Rentz, supra note 39 (“Paranoia,
depression, memory loss and self-mutilation are not uncommon.”); see also
GRUBERG, supra note 43 (referencing the negative health consequences of
seclusion).
180. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43, at 15.
181. Id. at 15–16.
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impacts, the United Nations Special Rapporteur has stated
that seclusion can constitute torture in certain circumstances,
and that seclusion should never be used with respect to
182
detainees who have mental disabilities.
Indeed, detainee self-harm and suicide are more common
183
in secluded populations than in non-secluded populations.
The features of seclusion that are believed to drive self-harm
and suicide include, but are not limited to, extreme social
isolation, reduced environmental stimulation, and loss of
184
control over almost all aspects of life. One researcher who
carefully reviewed the literature investigating the impact of
seclusion on detainee physical and mental health concluded
that, “[T]here is a large and growing body of literature that
demonstrates the harmful impact of isolation, particularly
when used punitively, without clear time limits, for periods
that are longer than four weeks and for people with prior
185
mental health problems and poor social adjustment.”
Some detainees do attempt suicide while in seclusion,
especially if they have not received needed mental health care
during detention. One detainee, who had a history of bipolar
disorder, panic attacks, addiction, and depression when he
arrived at Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, had
been
successfully
managing
his
condition
through
186
psychotherapy, prescription drugs, and other supports. Once
detained, his treatments were discontinued and he suffered a

182. Mendez, Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 43, at 2
(“Depending on the reasons for its use, the conditions through which it is
imposed, its duration, the gravity of its effects and other circumstances,
solitary confinement can amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or
even to torture.”); id. at 3 (“Solitary confinement should never be imposed to
minors, pregnant or breastfeeding women, or persons with mental disability.
In such cases, in view of the particular vulnerability of the detained person,
solitary confinement always amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, or torture.”).
183. See Johnson, supra note 47 (reporting that sixty-nine percent of
California’s prison suicides occurred in units where inmates are isolated for
twenty-three hours a day; further reporting that most of Texas’s prison
suicides involved inmates who were in some type of solitary confinement).
184. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43, at 17–20 (discussing in detail the factors
that make solitary confinement so harmful); see also COMMONWEALTH
OMBUDSMAN, supra note 25, at 45–69 (discussing other factors, including
vulnerability, the detention environment, frustrations associated with
immigration processing, and lengthy periods of detention).
185. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43, at 23.
186. PRISONERS OF PROFIT, supra note 64, at 63.
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187

panic attack so severe that guards thought he had a stroke.
In response, the detainee was secluded for over six months,
188
during which time he attempted suicide.
Interviews with detainees across the country reveal similar
stories. One detainee from Mexico who was secluded for four
months in 2010 became deeply depressed when he heard three
of his fellow detainees try to take their own lives. “‘Please God,’
189
he remembers praying, ‘don’t let me be the same.’” Although
this detainee lived to tell his story, many do not. On April 30,
2013, forty-year-old Jorge Garcia-Mejia hanged himself at the
190
Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona. Two days earlier,
twenty-four-year-old Elsa Guadalupe-Gonzales committed
191
suicide at the same detention facility, also by hanging.
Garcia-Mejia and Guadalupe-Gonzalez are 2 of 141 detainees
who died in ICE custody between October 2003 and December
192
2013.
Forty-four-year-old Ana Romero Rivera also hanged herself
while in seclusion at Franklin County Regional Jail in
193
Frankford, Kentucky, on August 21, 2008. Romero Rivera,
who was waiting to be deported to El Salvador, was secluded
194
Jose Lopez-Gregorio,
simply because she refused to eat.
Carlos Cortes Raudel, Sung Soo Heo, and Geovanny GarciaMejia also hanged themselves while in ICE custody at
detention centers located in Arizona, California, New Jersey,
195
Research shows that the most
and Texas, respectively.
common cause of death among detainees is suicide, in part
because detainees with mental illness “are relegated to the
darkest and most neglected corners of the [immigration
196
detention] system.” An estimated 13.5% of deaths that occur
197
in U.S. detention centers are suicides.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Urbina & Rentz, supra note 39.
190. Second Eloy Detainee, supra note 2.
191. First Eloy Detainee, supra note 1.
192. ICE DEATHS, supra note 3.
193. Lannen & Spears, supra note 5.
194. Id.
195. See Priest & Goldstein, supra note 98 (reporting these four suicides).
196. Id.
197. See Kristen C. Ochoa et al., Disparities in Justice and Care: Persons
with Severe Mental Illnesses in the U.S. Immigration Detention System, 38 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 392, 393 (2010) (citing Nina Bernstein, Officials
Say Detainee Fatalities Were Missed, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/us/18immig.html). In addition to the seclusion-
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II. HOSPITAL SECLUSION: BURNED AND REFORMED
Seclusion-related incidents, injuries, and deaths used to be
common in other contexts, including in the hospital and health
198
care facility context. In 1998, a patient was secluded in an
Oregon hospital for thirty straight hours, during which time
199
she was not allowed to use the restroom. In 1999, a patient
was secluded in a Missouri state psychiatric hospital for thirty
days, during which time he developed severe kidney problems
200
and muscle atrophy. Although these two seclusion incidents
did not result in death, many others have.
In 1990, a patient who was secluded at Creedmoor
201
Psychiatric Center in Queens, New York, set fire to his room.
The patient was not discovered until after he had burned to
202
A similar incident occurred in 1995 at a private
death.
203
Nevada hospital. There, a secluded patient also set fire to her
room and she, too, was not discovered until after she had died
204
of smoke inhalation.
In 1980, a patient at a state mental hospital in
Pennsylvania asphyxiated himself with his mattress cover
205
while he was in seclusion. In 1990, a patient at Mohawk
Valley Psychiatric Center in Utica, New York, was found with
206
no vital signs following a four-hour seclusion. In 1991, a
patient secluded at Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center in New
207
Hampton, New York, asphyxiated himself with his sock. In
1992, a patient at Creedmoor Psychiatric Center died of an
related injuries and deaths discussed above, many immigration detainees in
the U.S. and abroad are also injured or killed during the application of
restraint. See generally PETER STURMEY, REDUCING RESTRAINT AND
RESTRICTIVE BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 113 (2015) (discussing
detainee injuries and deaths associated with restraint).
198. See Tovino, Psychiatric Restraint, supra note 14 (historicizing
restraint and seclusion use in the health care setting in the United States,
providing data regarding the deaths associated with these interventions, and
reviewing the development of federal and state laws governing the use of these
interventions).
199. GAO REPORT, supra note 18, at 8.
200. Id.
201. Eric M. Weiss et al., Deadly Restraint: Database, CHARLY D. MILLER,
http://charlydmiller.com/LIB05/1998hartforddata.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2016).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Nelson et al., supra note 17.
206. See Weiss et al., supra note 201.
207. Id.
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overdose of six different drugs taken while in seclusion. In
1993, a patient at Capital District Psychiatric Center in
Albany, New York, was found dead in his seclusion room of an
209
apparent heart attack. In 1996, a patient at Finger Lakes
Developmental Disabilities Service Office in Rochester, New
York, was found dead in his seclusion room of a subdural
210
hematoma. In 1998, a researcher from the Center for Risk
Analysis at Harvard School of Public Health estimated that
between 50 and 150 patients were dying each year from unsafe
211
A related investigative
seclusion and restraint practices.
report estimated that approximately 5.5% of these deaths were
212
related to the seclusion intervention.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, a number of public and
private organizations began investigating these deaths with the
hope of identifying contributing factors that could be corrected.
In 1994, the New York State Commission on Quality of Care
(Commission) reported that 111 patients had died during
episodes of seclusion or restraint in New York psychiatric
213
The
hospitals during a ten-year period (1984 to 1993).
Commission identified factors that were believed to have
contributed to these deaths, including the failure of hospital
staff to attempt less restrictive measures to calm patients down
before imposing seclusion, the use of seclusion by staff
members untrained in safe seclusion practices, the failure of
staff to comply with relevant state statutes and regulations
limiting the length of time that patients may be placed in
seclusion, and the use of seclusion without adequate
214
recognition of suicide hazards.
Four years later, in 1998, the Hartford Courant published
a Pulitzer-Prize winning report highlighting the number of
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See STEPHAN HAIMOWITZ ET AL., RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION––A RISK
MANAGEMENT GUIDE 3 (2006) (reporting the Harvard estimates).
212. See Weiss et al., supra note 15 (classifying patient deaths over a tenyear period by the type of restraint, including physical restraint (47.2%),
mechanical restraint (44.1%), and combination of physical and mechanical
restraint (3.1%), as well as seclusion-related deaths (5.5%)).
213. N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY
DISABLED, RESTRAINT & SECLUSION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK STATE
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES 1 (1994) (“[I]n total, over the ten-year period 1984–
1993, 111 deaths associated with restraint and seclusion use have been
reported, investigated, and reviewed by the Board . . . .”).
214. Id. at 2.
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patients who died in the United States while in seclusion or
215
restraint during a ten-year period (1988 to 1998). According
to the Courant, 142 patients died during or shortly after
episodes of seclusion or restraint in hospitals and other health
216
care facilities located across the country. Of these 142 deaths,
23 patients died after being restrained by staff in face-down
floor holds, 20 patients died after they were restrained using
leather wrist and ankle cuffs or vests, and 33 percent of the
217
patients with confirmed causes of death died of asphyxia. The
Courant reported that inadequate staffing, inadequate staff
training, and a lack of standards governing the use of seclusion
218
and restraint placed patients at risk for injury and death.
The following year, the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) also issued a report stating that improper seclusion
219
practices could place patients at risk for injury and death.
Among other recommendations, the GAO urged health care
facilities to adopt policies establishing minimum staffing ratios,
identifying safe seclusion practices, and requiring staff training
220
relating to alternatives to seclusion.
Also in 1999, the National Association of State Mental
Health Program Directors (NASMHPD) issued the first of a
three-part report presenting the NASMHPD’s findings,
strategies, and recommendations regarding the reduction and
221
eventual elimination of seclusion and restraint. In particular,
215. See Weiss et al., supra note 15.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Kathleen Megan & Dwight F. Blint, Why They Die: Little
Training, Few Standards, Poor Staffing Put Lives at Risk, HARTFORD
COURANT, Oct. 12, 1998, at A1, ProQuest Newsstand, Doc. No. 256278401.
219. GAO REPORT, supra note 18, at 8, 22.
220. Id. at 22–23.
221. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS.’ MED.
DIRS. COUNCIL, REDUCING THE USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT: FINDINGS,
STRATEGIES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1999) (“This report is intended to
help guide the development of and to complement a NASMHPD position
statement on seclusion and restraint. . . . It is also intended as a tool for
helping states to prevent and reduce the overall need for seclusion and
restraint . . . .”); NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS.’ MED.
DIRS. COUNCIL, REDUCING THE USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT PART II:
FINDINGS, PRINCIPLES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIAL NEEDS
POPULATIONS, at iv (2001) (“It is NASMHPD’s goal to prevent, reduce, and
ultimately eliminate the use of seclusion and restraint and to ensure that,
when such interventions are necessary, they are administered in as safe and
humane a manner as possible by appropriately trained personnel.”); NAT’L
ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS.’ MED. DIRS. COUNCIL,
REDUCING THE USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT PART III: LESSONS FROM
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the NASMHPD stated that seclusion and restraint should only
be used as a last resort to protect the immediate health, safety,
or welfare of a patient or other person and should never be used
for patient discipline, patient coercion, staff convenience, or as
222
a substitute for a lack of staffing.
In 2003, the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA) recommended changes to
the mental health care system that would facilitate the
223
elimination of seclusion. These changes included improving
staff-to-patient ratios, requiring additional staff training
regarding crisis management and de-escalation techniques,
actively treating patients with mental health conditions, and
creating an institutional culture that values patient dignity
and supports each patient’s right to be free from unnecessary
224
SAMHSA also recommended law reforms that
seclusion.
would limit the imposition of seclusion to situations in which a
patient presents an imminent danger to herself or others, limit
the length of seclusion orders, require ongoing physician
monitoring and assessment of secluded patients, and require
patient and staff debriefing and education following each
225
seclusion intervention.
DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING COMMUNITIES 3 (2002) (“[T]his report
emphasizes the major lessons of the first two reports: That to reduce the use of
seclusion and restraint will require a broad cultural change in mental health
treatment settings.”); Position Statement on Seclusion and Restraint, NAT’L
ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., [hereinafter Position
Statement on Seclusion] http://www.nasmhpd.org/content/position-statement
-seclusion-and-restraint (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (“It is NASMHPD’s goal to
prevent, reduce, and ultimately eliminate the use of seclusion and restraint . .
. .”); see also Robert W. Glover, Reducing the Use of Seclusion and Restraint: A
NASMHPD Priority, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1141, 1141 (2005) (“I believe that
state facilities and other service providers must continue to make it a priority
to reduce and ultimately eliminate these coercive practices in order to improve
the quality of people’s lives.”).
222. Position Statement on Seclusion, supra note 221 (“[S]eclusion and
restraint . . . are safety interventions of last resort and are not treatment
interventions. Seclusion and restraint should never be used for the purposes of
discipline, coercion, or staff convenience, or as a replacement for adequate
levels of staff or active treatment.”).
223. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., A NATIONAL CALL TO ACTION: ELIMINATING THE USE
OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT (2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL CALL TO
ACTION]; see also Charles G. Curie, SAHMSA’s Commitment To Eliminating
the Use of Seclusion and Restraint, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1139, 1139–40
(2005) (reviewing SAHMSA’s commitment to eliminating the use of seclusion
and restraint in mental health care settings).
224. NATIONAL CALL TO ACTION, supra note 223, at 5.
225. Id. at 6.
THE
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226

Health law reform quickly followed. In 1999, the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) issued an interim final
rule applicable to all Medicare-participating hospitals (Interim
Final Rule) that established several new patients’ rights,
including the right: (1) to be free from seclusion imposed as a
means of coercion, discipline, convenience, or retaliation by
staff; (2) to be free from seclusion imposed for any reason other
than to ensure the patient’s physical safety after less restrictive
interventions have been determined to be ineffective; (3) to be
free from seclusion that is not ordered by a physician or other
licensed independent health care practitioner; (4) to be free
from seclusion as a standing order or on an “as needed” basis;
(5) to an evaluation by a physician or other licensed
independent health care practitioner within one hour after the
initiation of a seclusion intervention; (6) to seclusion orders
that last no longer than four hours for adults (and less time for
younger patients) and that end at the earliest possible time,
regardless of the time written in the order; (7) to a physical
assessment by a physician or licensed independent health care
practitioner before a subsequent seclusion order is issued; and
(8) to be treated by staff who have ongoing education and
training in the proper and safe use of seclusion as well as
alternative methods for handling behavior, symptoms, and
situations that traditionally have been managed through the
227
use of seclusion.

226. See, e.g., Hospital Conditions of Participation: Patients’ Rights,
Interim Final Rule with Comment, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,070, 36,070 (July 2, 1999)
(creating interim final rule that would establish new rights of patients in
Medicare-participating hospitals, including the right to be free from restraints
used in the provision of acute medical and surgical care unless clinically
necessary and the right to be free from seclusion and restraints used in
behavior management unless clinically necessary); Medicare and Medicaid
Programs, Hospital Conditions of Participation: Patients’ Rights, 71 Fed. Reg.
71,378, 71,378 (Dec. 8, 2006) (promulgating final rule revising standards
governing the use of restraint and seclusion in Medicare-participating
hospitals); Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Reform of Hospital and Critical
Access Hospital Conditions of Participation, 77 Fed. Reg. 29,034, 29,034 (May
16, 2012) (revising certain restraint- and seclusion-related standards); see also
Janice LeBel, Regulatory Change: A Pathway To Eliminating Seclusion and
Restraint or “Regulatory Scotoma?,” 59 PSYCHIATRY SERVS. 194, 194 (2008)
(noting that “[r]eports of deaths related to restraint and seclusion fueled
recent national regulatory changes and a federal agenda to eliminate their
use”; summarizing the health law reform that followed the Hartford Courant
investigative report).
227. Interim Final Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 36,089 (adopting then-current 42
C.F.R. § 482.13(f) (1999)).
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In 2006, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) issued its final patients’ rights rule applicable to
228
Medicare-participating hospitals (Final Rule). The Final Rule
strengthened the rights set forth by HCFA seven years earlier
in the Interim Final Rule, including the right of all patients to
be free from seclusion imposed as a means of coercion,
229
discipline, convenience, or retaliation by staff. The Final Rule
also added a new right relating to safe implementation of
230
seclusion by trained staff and a requirement that hospitals
231
report all deaths associated with seclusion. Six years later, in
2012, CMS issued a revised rule strengthening the death
232
reporting requirements set forth in the Final Rule.
During the same time period, many states’ departments of
mental health and freestanding mental health care institutions
formally committed themselves to reducing or attempting to
eliminate seclusion and restraint. Illustrative, not exhaustive,
examples of these departments and institutions include the
233
the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health,
234
Sheppard Pratt
Pennsylvania State Hospital System,
235
236
Creedmoor Psychiatric Center,
Western State
Hospital,
228. Hospital Conditions of Participation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 71,426–28
(adopting then-current 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(e), (f), and (g)).
229. Id. at 71,426–27 (adopting 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)).
230. Id. at 71,427–28 (adopting 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(f)).
231. Id. at 71,427–28 (adopting then-current 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(f), (g)).
232. Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Reform of Hospital and Critical
Access Hospital Conditions of Participation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 29,074 (revising
42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(g)(1)–(3) and adding 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(g)(4)).
233. See Janice LeBel & Robert Goldstein, The Economic Cost of Using
Restraint and the Value Added by Restraint Reduction or Elimination, 56
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1109, 1109–10 (2005) (discussing the Massachusetts
Department of Mental Health’s initiative to reduce seclusion and restraint in
psychiatric facilities serving children and adolescents; and, reporting a sixtyeight percent decrease in the number of episodes of seclusion and restraint
and a seventy-nine percent decrease in the number of hours of seclusion and
restraint).
234. See Gregory M. Smith et al., Pennsylvania State Hospital System’s
Seclusion and Restraint Reduction Program, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1115,
1115–17 (2005) (reviewing the Pennsylvania State Hospital System’s seclusion
and restraint reduction initiatives; reporting a decrease in the rate and
duration of seclusion and mechanical restraint from 4.2 to 0.3 episodes per
1,000 patient-days as well as a decrease in the average duration of seclusion
from 10.8 to 1.3 hours).
235. See Steven S. Sharftstein, Reducing Restraint and Seclusion: A View
From the Trenches, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 197, 197 (2008) (“In our hospital in
Baltimore with nearly 7,500 admissions per year, we have been successful in
dramatically reducing seclusion and restraint . . . . Episodes of seclusion and
restraint have dramatically decreased but have not yet been eliminated.”).
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Yale-New Haven Children’s Hospital,
North
Hospital,
239
240
Texas State Hospital Forensic Unit, Salem Hospital, and
241
just to name a
Connecticut’s Whiting Forensic Division,
242
few.
Soon thereafter, researchers began reporting associations
between the reduction in seclusion and restraint use and lower
numbers of patient injuries and deaths, shorter hospital
lengths of stay, decreased rates of re-hospitalization, lower

236. See William A. Fisher, Elements of Successful Restraint and Seclusion
Reduction Programs and Their Application in a Large, Urban, State
Psychiatric Hospital, 9 J. PSYCH. PRAC. 7, 12 (2003) (reporting that Creedmoor
Psychiatric Center experienced a sixty-seven percent decline in its combined
restraint and seclusion rate between 1999 and 2001 and a reduction in the
maximum restraint and seclusion order duration from four hours to one hour
over the same two-year period).
237. See Dennis C. Donat, An Analysis of Successful Efforts To Reduce the
Use of Seclusion and Restraint at a Public Psychiatric Hospital, 54
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1119, 1119 (2003) (reporting a seventy-five percent
reduction in the use of seclusion and restraint at Western State Hospital in
Staunton, Virginia, and underscoring the importance of identifying critical
cases and initiating clinical and administrative case reviews for such cases).
238. See Andres Martin et al., Reduction of Restraint and Seclusion
Through Collaborative Problem Solving: A Five-Year Prospective Inpatient
Study, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1406, 1409 (2008) (reporting a 37.6-fold
reduction in restraint use and a 3.2-fold reduction in seclusion use one and
one-half years after implementation of a collaborative problem solving
program for aggressive children and adolescents).
239. See Kelly R. Goodness & Nancy S. Renfro, Changing a Culture: A Brief
Program Analysis of a Social Learning Program on a Maximum-Security
Forensic Unit, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 495, 503–04, 504 fig.2 (2002) (reporting
reductions in the raw number of restraint and seclusion interventions despite
significant increases in patient admissions).
240. See Sandra L. Bloom, Foreword to RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION: THE
MODEL FOR ELIMINATING THEIR USE IN HEALTHCARE, at ix (Tim Murphy &
Maggie Bennington-Davis eds., 2005) (“They reduced the use of restraint and
seclusion [at Salem Hospital] to a point nearing total elimination . . . They
radically reduced the amount of violence on the unit and thereby reduced staff
injuries, reduced workmen’s compensation cases, and improved staff morale.
And the unit became more fiscally sound than it had ever been.”).
241. See Michael Rezendes, Bridgewater State Hospital Slow To Embrace
Change, BOS. GLOBE (June 1, 2014) (“The results were stunning: the use of
seclusion and restraints at Whiting, Connecticut’s mental health center for
patients involved in the criminal justice system, has dropped by more than 88
percent since 2004 . . . .”).
242. But see Christine Montross, The Modern Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/18/opinion/the-modern-asylum.html
(“[W]e have worked to minimize the use of restraint and seclusion on my unit,
but have seen the frequency of both skyrocket.”).
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rates of medication usage, higher levels of patient functioning
243
at the time of discharge, and increased patient satisfaction.
For example, the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health (Department) implemented a statewide Restraint/
Seclusion Reduction Initiative (Initiative) in 2000 that was
designed to reduce seclusion and restraint of minors treated in
244
public and private health care facilities across the state.
Within two years of the implementation of the Initiative, the
Department achieved significant reductions in the number of
seclusion and restraint interventions as well as decreases in
245
The
the rates of injuries to both patients and staff.
Department reported a sixty-eight percent decrease in the
number of episodes of seclusion and restraint (from 8,599 to
2,712) and a seventy-nine percent decrease in the number of
246
hours of seclusion and restraint (from 14,085 to 2,924). The
Department also experienced a decrease in costs associated
with seclusion and restraint as well as decreases in staff sick
time, staff turnover and replacement costs, workers’
compensation costs, injuries to adolescents and staff, and
patient recidivism, as well as significant improvements in
Adolescent Global Assessment of Functioning scores at
247
In its published report of the Initiative, the
discharge.
Department concluded, “Th[ese] shift[s] appear[] to have
contributed to better outcomes for adolescents, fewer injuries to
adolescents and staff, and lower staff turnover. The [I]nitiative
may have enhanced adolescent treatment and work conditions
248
for staff.”
Mental health care institutions that have successfully
reduced their use of the seclusion intervention have identified
249
several elements as keys to their success. These elements
include endorsement of seclusion-free initiatives by
administrators and other high-level leaders, patient
243. See, e.g., SAMHSA, BUSINESS CASE, supra note 20 (citing dozens of
studies reporting patient benefits associated with reductions in the use of
restraint and seclusion).
244. See EXEC. OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MASS. DEP’T OF
MENTAL HEALTH, RESTRAINT/SECLUSION REDUCTION INITIATIVE (2000)
[hereinafter MDMH INITIATIVE].
245. LeBel & Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1109.
246. Id. at 1110.
247. MDMH INITIATIVE, supra note 244.
248. LeBel & Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1109.
249. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 236, at 7–12 (identifying and discussing
elements key to successfully reducing seclusion).
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participation in the initiatives, staff training, culture changes,
250
Although the
and individualized treatment of patients.
relative importance of these elements may vary depending on
the setting in which they are applied, clinicians believe that
these elements may have relevance in other contexts in which
251
the seclusion intervention is being used and abused.
III. OF MICE AND MEN: ON THE SECLUSION OF
IMMIGRATION DETAINEES AND HOSPITAL PATIENTS
This Part III uses the health law developments described
in Part II as a lens through which the uses and abuses of
seclusion in immigration detention centers might be assessed
and through which the standards governing detention centers
might be improved. In particular, this Part argues that the
unenforceable standards governing seclusion in immigration
detention, including the most recent version of ICE’s
252
were
Performance-Based National Detention Standards,
incorrectly modeled on correctional standards developed for use
253
in jails and prisons with respect to convicted criminals. This
Part asserts that correctional standards are inappropriate
guidelines for use in the detention context for three reasons.
First, immigration detention is a form of civil, not criminal,
detention. Detention is imposed to ensure that immigrants will
be physically present for one or more immigration hearings and
will otherwise comply with the orders of an immigration
254
judge. Immigration detention is not punitive; that is, it is not
intended to punish individuals who are suspected of violating
255
immigration laws or any other laws. Indeed, most detainees
have no criminal record or have committed only minor crimes

250. See id. at 12 (“The methods of applying these essential elements will
differ depending on the setting in which they are applied. However, some of
the techniques described in this paper may be applicable, without major
changes, to other treatment settings attempting to reduce their use of
restraint and seclusion.”).
251. See id.
252. See 2011 PBNDS, supra note 13.
253. See, e.g., NIJC, supra note 4, at 11 (“[T]he 2011 PBNDS are still based
on American Correctional Association (ACA) pre-trial detention standards for
jails and prisons . . . .”).
254. Immigrants in Solitary, supra note 7 (“Civil detention is imposed not
as punishment, but simply to make sure somebody shows up for a hearing.”).
255. See García Hernández, supra note 107, at 1346 (explaining that, in
practice, the modern immigration detention system has accomplished punitive
goals and therefore requires reform to return to its intended civil nature).
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256

For this reason alone, ICE’s
such as traffic violations.
reliance on correctional standards is inappropriate.
Second, many detainees are extremely physically and
emotionally vulnerable due to their history of torture and
257
Detainees may be victims of human trafficking,
trauma.
sexual violence, political oppression, psychosocial trauma, and
acculturative stress, among other sources of violence and social
258
Research shows that a significant number of
disruption.
detainees have severe mental illnesses that may be associated
259
with or exacerbated by their histories of torture and trauma.
For these reasons, standards governing the imposition of
seclusion in hospitals (i.e., facilities that are designed to house
and care for patients who are physically ill and emotionally
vulnerable) are especially appropriate.
Third, many immigrants have lacked access to health
insurance and health care since they entered the United States,
and they continue to lack access to adequate mental health care
260
Indeed, of the 141 deaths that
following their detention.
occurred in U.S. detention facilities between 2003 and 2013,
most were caused by untreated coronary artery disease, blood
cancer, lymphatic cancer, pancreatic cancer, lung cancer, brain
256. See, e.g., NIJC, supra note 4, at 8 (“The majority of immigration
detainees have no criminal record, or have committed only minor crimes or
traf[f]ic violations, often years before being detained by ICE.” (footnote
omitted)).
257. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN, supra note 25, at 46 (stating
that a history of torture and trauma are among the factors contributing to selfharm in immigration detention in Australia).
258. See, Lisa Lopez Levers & Debra Hyatt-Burkhart, Immigration Reform
and the Potential for Psychosocial Trauma: The Missing Link of Lived Human
Experience, 12 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 68, 68 (2012) (examining
the “stress and potential psychosocial trauma that may be associated with
immigration and the acculturation process”); Immigrants in Solitary, supra
note 7 (“Many detainees are victims of political oppression or human
trafficking, many are only seeking better lives, some are ill. These are people
America should be sheltering, not arbitrarily brutalizing.”).
259. See, e.g., Ochoa et al., supra note 197 (stating that officials estimate
that fifteen percent of immigration detainees are mentally ill); Katy Robjant et
al., Mental Health Implications of Detaining Asylum Seekers: Systematic
Review, 194 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 306, 306 (2009) (“Findings consistently
report high levels of mental health problems among detainees. There is some
evidence to suggest an independent adverse effect of detention on mental
health.”); Lindy Kerin, Alarming Rates of Mental Illness Among Kids in
Immigration Detention, ABC.NET (July 31, 2014, 8:24 AM) (discussing the
high rates of mental illness among Australian immigration detainees).
260. See Marouf, supra note 26 (addressing the lack of access to health
insurance by individuals with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
and Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) status).
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cancer, sepsis, liver disease, renal failure, pneumonia, seizure
disorders, emphysema, HIV, and drug addictions, among other
261
conditions. In light of the high rate of untreated physical
illness among detained populations, the imposition of hospital
standards, rather than correctional standards, is especially
appropriate.
This Article proposes to reform the standards governing
the use of seclusion in immigration detention centers in nine
different ways. First, ICE should impose one uniform set of
standards on all detention centers located in the United States.
As background, patients in Medicare-participating hospitals
have uniform patients’ rights that are codified in federal
262
There is one current set of patients’ rights
regulations.
standards governing the imposition of seclusion that are set
forth at 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e), (f), and (g) (Patients’ Rights
Standards), and these Patients’ Rights Standards apply to all
Medicare-participating hospitals, regardless of whether they
are public or private hospitals, general or special hospitals,
psychiatric hospitals, children’s hospitals, cancer hospitals,
263
long-term care hospitals, or other hospitals. These Standards
also apply to all hospital patients, regardless of their location in
the hospital. For example, the Patients’ Rights Standards apply
to patients who are admitted to psychiatric units, labor and
delivery units, and other inpatient units, as well as patients
who receive services through the emergency department or
264
other outpatient departments. The uniform application of

261. See ICE DEATHS, supra note 3 (providing information regarding the
final cause of death in the last column).
262. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(e), (f), (g) (2014) (regulating the use of
seclusion in Medicare-participating hospitals); sources cited supra note 226
(identifying the history and sources of the current patients’ rights standards
set forth in the Medicare Conditions of Participation).
263. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 34, reg. A0154 (“[T]hese restraint and seclusion regulations apply to . . . [a]ll hospitals
(acute care, long-term care, psychiatric, children’s, and cancer); [a]ll locations
within the hospital (including medical/surgical units, critical care units,
forensic units, emergency department, psychiatric units, etc.); and [a]ll
hospital patients, regardless of age, who are restrained or secluded (including
both inpatients and outpatients.”)).
264. See id. (“The patient protections contained in this standard apply to
all hospital patients when the use of restraint or seclusion becomes necessary,
regardless of patient location. The requirements contained in this standard
are not specific to any treatment setting within the hospital. They are not
targeted only to patients on psychiatric units or those with behavioral/mental
health care needs. Instead, the requirements are specific to the patient
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these Patients’ Rights Standards to all Medicare-participating
hospitals, all units and departments within each hospital, and
all inpatients and outpatients who receive services from these
hospitals ensures that staff members are not confused
regarding when the substantive rules governing the imposition
of seclusion apply.
In the detention setting, ICE does have some detention
standards that contain instructions relating to the seclusion of
detainees, but these instructions do not apply uniformly to all
detention centers. That is, the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) issued one set of National
265
ICE issued a
Detention Standards in 2000 (2000 NDS),
second set of Performance-Based National Detention Standards
266
and ICE issued a third set of
in 2008 (2008 PBNDS),
Performance-Based National Detention Standards in 2011
267
(2011 PBNDS). Some detention centers only comply with the
2000 NDS or the 2008 PBNDS because their contracts with
ICE do not specify that they have to comply with the more
recent 2011 PBNDS. The Etowah County Jail in Gadsden,
Alabama, for example, is only contractually obligated to follow
268
the 2000 PBNDS. Similarly, the Theo Lacy Detention Center
in Orange, California, is only contractually obligated to follow
269
the 2008 PBNDS.
In addition, ICE has several sets of seclusion standards
that apply differently depending on the location of the detainee
and the purported reason for the seclusion, unlike the strict
rules governing seclusion in the Patients’ Rights Standards
that apply to all hospital patients regardless of their location or
behavior that the restraint or seclusion intervention is being used to
address.”).
265. 2000 Detention Operations Manual, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENF’T (2000), http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2000 (describing the
implementation of the 2000 standards).
266. 2008 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention
Standards, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T (2008), https://www.ice.gov/
detention-standards/2008 (describing the implement of 2008 standard).
267. 2011 PBNDS, supra note 13.
268. ETOWAH COUNTY JAIL REPORT, supra note 84, at 6–7 (“Etowah
currently operates according to the 2000 National Detention Standards. There
have been two new editions of the Detention Standards since 2000, but ICE
has so far failed to implement them at Etowah. ICE recently approached
Etowah about implementation of the latest standards . . . but the feasibility
and timeline for this remains unclear.”).
269. THEO LACY DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note 40, at 5–6 (noting
that the Orange County Sheriff’s Department is contractually obligated to
follow the 2008 PBNDS).
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the reason for their seclusion. Using the 2011 PBNDS as an
example, there are some isolation standards that apply when
the proffered reason for seclusion is a detainee’s “medical
270
care,” other isolation standards that apply when the proffered
reason is a detainee’s risk of “significant self-harm and
271
suicide,” other “administrative segregation” standards that
272
apply in special management units, still other “disciplinary
segregation” standards that apply in special management
273
units, and still other segregation standards that apply to
274
situations involving the “use of force and restraints.” Having
five different sets of seclusion standards that apply in five
different situations or locations is less than ideal and can result
in a lack of clarity regarding when and how a detainee may be
secluded.
Second, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must
make the standards governing immigration detention centers
legally enforceable in the same way that the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) has made the Patients’
Rights Standards legally enforceable. As background, hospitals
that violate the Patients’ Rights Standards risk termination of
275
which is a
their Medicare participating-provider status,
276
financial death sentence for most hospitals. Hospitals that
violate the Patients’ Rights Standards also risk loss of their
270. See 2011 PBNDS, supra note 13, at 277, 282–85 (Standard 4.3,
Medical Care).
271. See id. at 314, 316–19 (Standard 4.6, Significant Self-Harm and
Suicide Prevention and Intervention).
272. See id. at 178, 181–84 (Standard 2.12, Special Management Units).
273. See id. at 184–86.
274. See id. at 208, 210–18 (Standard 2.15, Use of Force and Restraints).
275. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.1(b) (2014) (“[T]he provisions of this part serve as
the basis of survey activities for the purpose of determining whether a hospital
qualifies for a provider agreement under Medicare and Medicaid.”); id.
§ 489.53(a)(1), (3) (allowing the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) to terminate a hospital’s participating-provider agreement if CMS finds
that the hospital is not complying with the Conditions of Participation);
Broughton Hosp. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Docket No. C-08-34
(Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Appeals Board Mar. 19, 2009) (involving a
case in which CMS sought to terminate Broughton Hospital’s provider
agreement based on allegations of violations of the Patients’ Rights
Standards).
276. See, e.g., SPEAKER NOTE SET, supra note 36, at 13 slide 18 (“The effect
of exclusion is very serious. Excluded [providers] may not bill for treating
Medicare and Medicaid patients, nor may their services be billed indirectly
through an employer or a group practice. Because of this prohibition, some
refer to exclusion as a ‘financial death sentence’ for any health care
provider.”).
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277

Joint Commission accreditation, the imposition of steep civil
monetary penalties (ranging from $3,050 to $10,000 per day,
per violation) from the HHS Office of Inspector General for
situations that have caused, or are likely to have caused,
278
serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a patient, as
well as civil penalties for false claims submitted to the
Medicare program for treatments and services provided to
inappropriately secluded patients under the federal False
279
Non-compliant hospitals also risk private
Claims Act.
lawsuits by patients alleging violations of general patients’
rights statutes and specific statutes governing seclusion as well
as common law negligence and false imprisonment causes of
280
Patients also can obtain injunctions preventing
action.
hospital staff from continuing their inappropriate seclusion
281
practices.
Faced with these legal risks, many hospitals accused of
282
inappropriate patient seclusion or restraint quickly settle. On
277. Interested in Hospital Accreditation?, JOINT COMM’N, http://www
.jointcommission.org/accreditation/hospital_seeking_accreditation.aspx
(last
visited Apr. 20, 2016).
278. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(a)(1)(i) (2014) (detailing the $3,050 to $10,000
per day civil monetary penalties that may be imposed for deficiencies
constituting immediate jeopardy); id. § 489.3 (defining immediate jeopardy as
a situation in which a health care provider’s noncompliance with one or more
Conditions of Participation “has caused, or is likely to cause, serious injury,
harm, impairment, or death to a resident”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL: APPENDIX Q—GUIDELINES FOR
DETERMINING IMMEDIATE JEOPARDY (2004), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations
-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/som107ap_q_immedjeopardy.pdf
(outlining situations that constitute immediate jeopardy).
279. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctrs., 945
F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (evaluating whether a psychiatric hospital
that failed to provide patients with a reasonably safe environment and then
billed Medicare for services provided to those patients submitted “false claims”
within the meaning of the federal False Claims Act).
280. See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Sec’y of Human Servs., 521 N.E.2d 997, 997
(Mass. 1988) (holding that state officials engaged in inappropriate seclusion
and restraint practices in violation of state statute governing seclusion); Alt v.
Parker, 435 S.E.2d 773, 774 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (considering a secluded
patient’s alleged cause of action against a hospital for false imprisonment and
violation of North Carolina’s patients’ rights standards); Schaidler v. Mercy
Med. Ctr., 563 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (involving a suit where a
secluded and restrained patient alleged patients’ rights violations, negligence,
and false imprisonment against hospital and physicians).
281. E.g., O’Sullivan, 521 N.E.2d at 997.
282. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CENTRAL MONTGOMERY
MEDICAL CENTER (2005) [hereinafter SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT] (setting forth
the terms of Central Montgomery Medical Center’s $200,000 settlement with
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August 6, 2002, for example, a seventy-nine-year-old woman
with Alzheimer’s disease died at Central Montgomery Medical
283
Center after an inappropriate restraint intervention. Even
though county medical officials ruled that the woman’s death
was an accidental asphyxiation, the federal government used
the incident as an opportunity to investigate the hospital’s
284
restraint policies. On July 25, 2005, the U.S. Attorney for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania announced that the
Department of Justice had reached a settlement agreement
with the hospital based on allegations that the hospital had,
throughout much of 2002, restrained patients in violation of the
285
Patients’ Rights Standards. Although the hospital denied the
improper restraint allegations, the hospital quickly agreed to
pay the federal government $200,000 and hire an independent
consultant who would evaluate the hospital’s policies governing
286
patient restraints.
In the detention setting, ICE does have some standards
that provide instructions on the use of seclusion in the
287
However, unlike the Patients’ Rights
detention context.
Standards, the detention standards are not enforceable in
288
court. DHS must make these standards legally enforceable.
The lack of accountability of detention centers under the 2000
NDS, the 2008 PBNDS, and the 2011 PBNDS results in
insufficient protections for the health, safety, and welfare of
immigration detainees.

the federal government relating to allegations of improper use of physical and
chemical restraints); Stacey A. Tovino, Patient Restraint Allegations and the
False Claims Act, HEALTH L. PERS. (Aug. 23, 2005), http://www.law.uh.edu/
healthlaw/perspectives/August2005/(ST)Restraints.pdf
(discussing
the
Settlement Agreement).
283. Tovino, supra note 282, at 1.
284. Id.
285. Press Release, U.S. Attorney, E.D. Pa., U.S. Attorney’s Office Reaches
Agreement with Hospital To Resolve Failure of Care Allegations Stemming
from Improper Use of Patient Restraints (July 25, 2005), http://www.uft-a
.com/PDF/cmmc.pdf.
286. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 282, at 2–3.
287. See supra notes 270–74 and accompanying text (identifying a variety
of seclusion standards set forth in the 2011 PBNDS that apply in different
situations).
288. See ETOWAH COUNTY JAIL REPORT, supra note 84, at 7 (“Furthermore,
as internal ICE guidelines, the Detention Standards are not legally
enforceable, so immigrants have very limited recourse if the facility does not
follow them.”); NIJC, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that the 2011 PBNDS “remain
legally unenforceable”).
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Third, the philosophy behind ICE’s detention standards
must be improved. (To give ICE the benefit of the argument,
this Article will compare ICE’s 2011 PBNDS to HHS’s Patients’
Rights Standards, even though many detention centers are
only contractually obligated to comply with the less stringent
2000 NDS or the 2008 PBNDS.) For example, the Patients’
Rights Standards require seclusion and restraint of hospital
patients to be “discontinued at the earliest possible time,”
289
regardless of the length of time identified in the order.
Compare this language with the 2011 PBNDS provision stating
that, “[s]taff may not remove restraints until the detainee is no
290
longer a danger to himself or others.” This is an important
philosophical difference: In health law, hospital patients are
relieved of these interventions at the first possible moment. In
immigration detention, these interventions continue as long as
necessary. ICE should adopt the seclusion- and restraint-free
philosophy behind the Patients’ Rights Standards.
Fourth, the Patients’ Rights Standards have specific rules
governing the imposition of seclusion. Under federal health
law, hospitals may only impose seclusion or restraint for one
reason; that is, “to ensure the immediate physical safety of the
291
patient, a staff member, or others.” Hospital patients cannot
be secluded for any other reason, including for “coercion,
292
discipline, convenience, or retaliation by staff.” In its “Use of
Force and Restraints” standard, however, ICE permits the
restraint of detainees “as a precaution against escape during
transfer; for medical reasons, when directed by the medical
officer; or to prevent self-injury, injury to others, or property
293
damage.” In its “Medical Care” standard, ICE permits the
isolation of a detainee “who is at high risk for violent behavior
because of a mental health condition,” regardless of whether
the detention center has attempted to treat that mental health
condition and regardless of whether that detainee poses an
294
In its “Special
immediate danger to herself or others.
Management Units” standard, ICE permits the administrative
289. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e) (2014) (“Restraint or seclusion . . . must be
discontinued at the earliest possible time.”); id. § 482.13(e)(9) (“Restraint or
seclusion must be discontinued at the earliest possible time, regardless of the
length of time identified in the order.”).
290. 2011 PBNDS, supra note 13, at 211 (Standard 2.15(V)(B)(9)).
291. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e).
292. Id.
293. 2011 PBNDS, supra note 13, at 210 (Standard 2.15(V)(B)(1)).
294. Id. at 292 (Standard 4.3(V)(N)(5)).
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segregation of detainees simply “to ensure the safety of
detainees or others, the protection of property, or the security
295
or good order of the facility.” ICE also allows for disciplinary
segregation “[t]o provide detainees in the general population a
296
safe and orderly living environment.” This Article argues that
detainees should not be restrained, isolated, segregated, or
otherwise secluded for any reason other than to ensure the
immediate physical safety of the detainee himself or herself, a
staff member, or others. In addition, the intervention must be
ended at the earliest possible time.
Fifth, the Patients’ Rights Standards limit the individuals
who may order restraint or seclusion to a physician or other
licensed independent health care practitioner. On the other
hand, the 2011 PBNDS allow “staff” to impose administrative
297
an “institution disciplinary panel” to impose
segregation,
298
299
disciplinary segregation, and “staff” to impose restraints.
Given the high risk of injury, self-harm, and suicide in secluded
and restrained populations, this Article argues that only
physicians and other licensed, independent health care
practitioners who are trained in identifying detainees who are
at risk for self-harm and suicide should have the authority to
order seclusion and restraint.
Sixth, the Patients’ Rights Standards have specific rules
governing the duration of seclusion orders. In the hospital
setting, a seclusion order for an adult patient may be written
300
for a maximum time period of four hours. Orders for the
seclusion of children aged nine to seventeen may be written for
301
no longer than two hours, and orders for the seclusion of
children less than nine years of age may written for no longer
302
Again, all seclusion orders “must be
than one hour.
discontinued at the earliest possible time, regardless of the
303
length of time identified in the order.” Compare these health
law standards with ICE’s standards, which permit disciplinary
segregation for periods lasting as long as thirty days (not

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 181 (Standard 2.12(V)(A)).
Id. at 184 (Standard 2.12(V)(B)).
Id. at 178 (Standard 2.12(II)(4)).
Id. at 185 (Standard 2.12(V)(B)).
Id. at 210 (Standard 2.15(V)(B)(4)).
42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(8)(i)(A) (2014).
Id. § 482.13(e)(8)(i)(B).
Id. § 482.13(e)(8)(i)(C).
Id. § 482.13(e)(9).
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hours), “except in extraordinary circumstances” involving
certain offenses, in which case the segregation may last for a
304
longer period of time. Given the finding of the United Nations
Special Rapporteur that lengthy seclusion can constitute
torture and that individuals should not be secluded for more
than fifteen days, ICE should adopt the maximum time periods
set forth in federal health law.
Seventh, the Patients’ Rights Standards have strict rules
governing the frequency with which secluded patients shall be
monitored. For example, secluded hospital patients must be
seen face-to-face within one hour after the initiation of the
seclusion intervention by a physician or other licensed
independent practitioner to evaluate the patient’s immediate
situation, the patient’s reaction to the intervention, the
patient’s medical and behavioral condition, and the need to
305
continue or terminate the seclusion intervention. Compare
these rules with the administrative segregation rules that
apply to detainees, which only require a review “within 72
hours of the detainee’s placement in administrative segregation
306
to determine whether segregation is still warranted.” Further
compare the disciplinary segregation rules that apply to
detainees, which only require a review “every seven days” to
307
determine whether continued segregation is warranted.
These standards should be revised to require more frequent
monitoring and review of the continued need for the seclusion
order.
Eighth, the Patients’ Rights Standards contain stringent
staff training requirements. That is, hospitals are required to
train staff members regarding all of the following: (1)
techniques to identify behaviors, events, and environmental
factors that may trigger situations historically calling for
restraint or seclusion; (2) the use of less restrictive nonphysical intervention skills; (3) the selection of the least
restrictive intervention based on an individualized assessment
of the patient’s physical and emotional status; (4) the safe
304. 2011 PBNDS, supra note 13, at 185 (“The maximum sanction is 30
days in disciplinary segregation per violation, except in extraordinary
circumstances, such as violations of offense 101 through 109 listed in the
‘Greatest’ offense category in Appendix 3.1.A. After the first 30 days, and each
30 days thereafter, the facility administrator shall send a written justification
for the continued segregation to the Field Office Director.”).
305. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(12).
306. 2011 PBNDS, supra note 13, at 184 (Standard 2.12(V)(A)(3)(a)).
307. Id. at 185 (Standard 2.12(V)(B)(3)(a)).
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application and use of restraint and seclusion, including
training regarding how to recognize and respond to physical
and psychological distress; (5) the identification of specific
behavioral changes that indicate that the restraint or seclusion
interventions are no longer necessary; and (6) the use of first
aid techniques and certification in the use of cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, including required periodic recertification, among
308
other requirements. Compare these requirements with ICE’s
minimal training requirements, which simply provide that, “all
staff responsible for supervising detainees shall receive a
minimum of eight hours of training initially during orientation
and repeated at least annually, on effective methods for
identifying significant self-harm, as well as suicide prevention
309
ICE must improve the
and intervention with detainees.”
content and frequency of its staff training requirements.
Finally, the Patients’ Rights Standards contain important
death reporting requirements. That is, hospitals must report
the following information to the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services no later than the close of business on the
next business day following knowledge of a patient’s death: (1)
each death of a secluded patient; (2) each death that occurs
within twenty-four hours after the completion of a seclusion
intervention; and (3) each death that is known to a hospital and
that occurs within one week after seclusion where it is
reasonable to assume that seclusion directly or indirectly
310
contributed to a patient’s death. Compare these reporting
requirements with ICE’s death reporting requirements, which
only require the completion of an incident report within
twenty-four hours as well as adherence to the Notification and
311
Reporting of Detainee Deaths Directive. ICE must strengthen
its death reporting requirements.
In summary, HHS and DHS have very different
philosophical and practical approaches to the oversight of, and
the rights of individuals in Medicare-participating hospitals
and immigration detention centers, respectively. It is the
central thesis of this Article that federal health law can provide
significant guidance with respect to appropriate detention
center regulation.

308.
309.
310.
311.

42 C.F.R. § 482.13(f)(2).
2011 PBNDS, supra note 13, at 314 (Standard 4.6(II)(1)).
42 C.F.R. § 482.13(g)(1)(i)–(iii).
2011 PBNDS, supra note 13, at 319 (Standard 4.6(V)(I)).
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Under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), the Secretary of DHS has the
authority to issue legally enforceable federal regulations
establishing the standard of care for individuals in ICE
312
custody. This Article proposes that DHS issue a proposed rule
that would establish enforceable regulations guided by the nine
recommendations above. These regulations could be codified at
8 C.F.R. Part 242, a currently open Part within Subchapter B
313
of Title 8 of DHS’s Immigration Regulations. Using the nine
recommendations outlined in this Article above as a roadmap
and using HHS’s Patients’ Rights Standards codified at 42
C.F.R. § 482.13(e), (f), and (g) as a guide, this Article
recommends the following structure for these new regulations:
8 C.F.R. Part 242
242.1 Definitions
242.2 Right to Be Free from Unnecessary Restraint and
Seclusion
242.3 Standard for Restraint and Seclusion
242.4 Individuals Who May Order Restraint or Seclusion
242.5 Maximum Time Limits for Restraint and Seclusion
Orders
242.6 Discontinuation of Restraint and Seclusion Orders at
the Earliest Possible Time
242.7 Detainee Monitoring Requirements
242.8 Staff Training Requirements
242.9 Death Reporting Requirements
242.10 Complaints and Investigations
242.11 Penalties for Non-Compliance
To enforce these regulations, DHS should strengthen the
authority of its current Detention Service Managers within
314
to investigate
ICE’s Detention Management Division
detainee complaints and other allegations of non-compliance
and to impose penalties for confirmed regulatory violations.

312. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2014) (“[The Secretary of Homeland
Security] shall establish such regulations . . . and perform such other acts as
he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this
chapter.”).
313. See 8 C.F.R. pt. 242 (2014) (Reserved).
314. See Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENF’T (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/detention-management
(describing the operations and activities of the Detention Management
Division).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has carefully examined the uses and abuses of
seclusion in the context of immigration detention and draws
three primary conclusions. First, ICE’s unenforceable detention
standards lack uniformity and fail to protect the health, safety,
and welfare of detainees. Second, current proposals for
detention center reform are based on constitutional law and
international human rights provisions, which lack the
specificity necessary to protect detainees from physical and
emotional abuse and neglect. Third, federal health law,
including regulations governing the imposition of seclusion in
Medicare-participating hospitals, provide an excellent guide for
the reform of detention center seclusion standards. This Article
makes nine recommendations that are designed to correct
detention centers’ excessive use and abuse of the seclusion
intervention. This Article also proposes a structure for legally
enforceable federal regulations governing the imposition of
seclusion. If promulgated by DHS, these regulations will
protect detainees from further abuse, self-harm, and suicide,
and will re-align the philosophy of detainee care with the civil
nature of immigration detention.

